Sir: Wright

THE AGES OF *MANS LIFE:*

WITH THE

Originall cauſes, Progreſſe, and End thereof.

Learnedly diſcuſs'd.

Ῥᾶον μωμᾶσθαι ἢ μιμεῖσθαι.

LONDON,
Printed for *Andrew Crooke* and are to bee ſold at the Green Dragon in Pauls Church-yard, 1653.

The Preface.

THe Learned Heraclite no leſſe elegant than Enigmaticall, among other his quaint ſpeeches, hath this ſaying of ſpeciall remembrance and obſervation: That the greedy Mettall-mongers, in their too eager ſearch for the meaſured Worlds wealth, after long toyle and troble, finde parvum in magno, a little pure ſubſtance, in a great deale of unprofitable earth. Contrarily it fareth in the inquiſition and purſuit of Learning, where we often finde with a little abſtractive ſpeculation, magnum in parvo, much matter in few words, every ſhort golden Sentence and Particle thereof, containing incredible ſtore of more pure ſubſtance. For as the cunning Colmographers, draw the

whole compaſſe of the wide World, in
the narrow precincts of a ſmall Mappe;
have our learned Artiſts contracted t
unconceiveable amplitude of the Libera
Sciences into volumes, of ſmall quantit
But as gold, the pureſt of all Mettals, ho
ſoever couched in a little compaſſe, is m
ny times beaten out into a marvelous am
plitude; ſo the ſhort Aphoriſmes of Ph
loſophy, in the currant of a ſmall perio
comeprehend ſubſtance ſufficient to f
whole volumes. Which truth is confirme
or rather manifeſted by the preſent matt
we intreat of, wherby as Pythogoras fi
ding the print of Hercules his foot, geſſ
thereby at the proportion of his whole bo
ſo we by the view of this ſo little and ne
lected a peece of Philoſophy, may gath
what wee are to thinke of the whole bo
(that I may ſo ſpeake) of Learning. Whi
I obſerue the rather, becauſe I ſe many ſh
low headed Artificers oftentimes condem
us of folly, that ſpend our whole Life in t
ſtu

ſtuddy of good Letters, and yet (ſuch is our groſſe conceit) we never come to the requiſite perfection of Knowledge. As if our Arts were like the Mechanicall Sciences of baſe Prentiſes, that may be throughly learned in the compaſſe of Seaven yeeres. It was well ſayd of one, Ars longa, vita brevis, we have a grat taske, and a ſhort time. I have read of ſome who in the compaſſe of three yeers, have ſayled about the World, but I never yet heard of any who in the whole courſe of his life, how laboriouſly ſoever paſſed over, was able to compaſſe the whole Circle of Sciences. And therefore Theophraſtes, a learned Philoſopher lying on his deathbed, accuſed Nature of unkindneſſe or rather want of diſcretion, that ſo inconſiderately doth beſtow the ineſtimable benefit of long life upon brute Beaſtes and ſenſible Creatures, that can neither acknowledge ſo high a favour, nor by theyre length of dayes benefit themſelves and others; but man that might in time reſtore

decayed

decayed nature by perfecting the imperfect
Arts, hath his induring but as a moment
implying that the whole course of a man
life, was not time sufficient to worke per-
fection in. And therefore, well sayd Sigil-
mund *the* Emperour *to a* Doctor *of* Law,
whom for an excellent Stratagem *against*
the enemy he had Knighted not long before,
when at an Assembly of Peeres *and* Coũ-
sellers, *the* Docter *doubted to whether*
company he might with greatest credit ioyn
himselfe, It is doubtfull, *sayd the Empe-*
rour, whether learning or military expe-
rience is more honorable? I can in one
day make a thousand good Souldiers
but I am not able in a thousand yeares
to make one tolerable Doctor. *So that it*
is no marvel though Socrates, *after his lõg*
time of life, yet on his death-bed confessed
hee had many things to learne. And me
thinketh these nimble witted Tradesmen, do
not so much magnifie their owne quick con-
ceit, as publish the facility to their Sciences

is it

For as Apelles *ſaid well unto a* Painter *that bragged of his ſpeedy workmanſhip, when ſhewing his picture hee ſaid,* This I drew even now. Surely, *ſaid* Apelles, though thou hadſt ſayd nothing, yet ſhould I eaſily have gueſſed by the workmanſhip, that it was done in haſte. *So may wee well ſay to theſe quick witted Mechanicall Tradeſmen, a man that hath but a little inſight into the Trade, may well thinke their Crafts are ſoone learned; and I rather marvell,* (*as* Apelles *ſaid*) *that they learned no more in the ſame quantity and length of time. But it fareth with the groſſe phantaſie as it doth with our eie-ſight in an unequall diſtance from the object: for as being farre off we conceive of the unmeaſurable greatneſſe of the moſt huge hilles to be but as a point: ſo the infinite excellencies of the heavenly* Arts, *being too far removed from their groſſe, or rather narrow capacity, com into their conceit as things of leſſe moment: which if their dimme or rather weake eye-*

eye-ſight were able to behold in their div
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unto, by the judgment of the wiſe Apol
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paines and leſſe ability ſhall be accepte
good worth and accounted of, rather acc
ding to the good intent of the Author, th
the worthineſſe of the Worke. In which h
of acceptation for my good endeavors, a
favourable pardon of my manifold erro
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THE DIFFERENCES of the Ages of Mans Life.

Together with the Originall cauſes, progreſſe, and end thereof.

Chap. I.

Man being called the Little World, in reſpect of reſemblance to the Frame of the Great World, and

coexistence with the same : The question of the Worlds Eternity is fitly propounded.

MAN the *Epitome* of the whole *World*, *Lord* of the *Creatures*, in regard of that perfect Analogie and resemblance betweene him and the Great Worlds frame, is not unfitly by the Learned, both *Divines* and *Philosophers*, termed, The *Lesser World* : for there is nothing in the vast compasse of this universal circumference, whose likenesse and lively representation we have not summarily compriled in man, as in a most perfect compendium and abridgement. For as the *first moved sphere* carrieth with its motion, the sub-

ject

ject inferiour *circles*, ſo the ſervile underfaculties, as the *ſenſuall deſire* and *appetite*, are by *nature* ſubdued to the dominion and guidance of the more principall and miſtriſſe power of the ſoule, which wee call *reaſon*. And as in the midſt of heaven there is ſcituated the *Sunne*, that enlightneth all things with his raies, & cheriſheth the world, and the things therein contayned with his life-keeping *heat*: ſo the heart of man, the fountayne of *life* and *heat*, hath aſſigned to it by *Nature*, the middle part of our body for his habitation, from whence proceedeth *life* and *heat*, unto all the parts of the body, (as it were unto Rivers) whereby they be preſerved and enabled to perform their naturall and proper functions. But not to bee infinite in proſecuting the particulars of this well known compariſon, as in other things we ſee a perfect proportion, ſo alſo, beſide the *analogie*

wee may obſerve a mutuall *coexiſtence*. For as the *world* at the beginning was created for *man*, ſo with *man* it ſhall alſo bee aboliſhed : for it is an undeniable principle in *Philoſophie*, that *God* and *Nature*, or rather the *God of Nature neither effectually worketh, nor permiſſively ſuffereth any thing, but unto ſome good end.* For being infinitely wiſe, nay *wiſedome* it ſelfe, how can we imagine ſo high a point of folly, reſident in his God-heade, as to allow of *vanities*, things ſo hatefull, and ſo abhorring from all mediocrity of wiſedome? Wherfore man having a determinate date of endurance which hee cannot paſſe, the *world* alſo, which is only for mans uſe and ſervice, muſt of neceſſity have an end of being. Now becauſe there is (as wee ſayd) a mutuall coexiſtence of the world and man, as the world is not but for man, ſo neyther is man, but in and by the world. For as in

Navigation, thoſe that are in the *ſhip*, have reſt and motion with the moving and ceſſation of the *ſhip*, ſo we that are toſſed in the rough ſea of this *world*, in our voyage unto *heaven* our ſafeſt haven, when our veſſell of carriage once periſheth, we alſo periſh together. For as *Ariſtotle* ſayd truly, that *whatſoever hath being, hath of neceſsity being in ſome place*; ſo from thence ariſeth this neceſſary illation, that when there is once left no place to bee in, then ſhall there remaine no longer being. So that intending to ſhew this truth as very pertinent to our purpoſe, viz. *That man hath an appointed time of being, which hee cannot paſſe*, the *Queſtion* of the *Worlds eternity* is fitly incident, eſpecially, ſeeing, as is aforeſayd, the World is for mans ſake, and man by means of the World.

2 Now if any man ſhall call into queſtion, the pertinency of this *queſti-*

on, for his ſatisfaction and reſolution in that behalfe, let him conſider how neceſſarily upon the variation of our *temperature*, (whence the diſtinction of ages proceedeth) a finall deſtruction, by an unperceivable lingring decay of purity in our ſubſtance, doeth depend. For as in the violent motion of things *naturall*, wee ſee it comes to paſſe, that the *vertue* or *power* of mooving, imprinted by the naturall *mover*, by little and little decaying, at length by continuance of moving, or rather by the reſiſtance of the bodies about it, is cleane extinguiſhed: So in the naturall proceeding toward the enemy and end of *nature*, *Death*, the preſerving meanes of life, (eyther by the toyleſomneſſe of their never ceaſing operation, or by the corruption and mixture of impure moyſture, infeebled and diſabled to the ſufficient performance of their function, more and more every day)

day) at length of force yeeldes to the oppreſſing violence of their reſiſting adverſaries, not able any longer to mayntayne their conquering action, ſo that the diſcuſſing of this controverſie is very homogeneous to the ſeries of this Treatiſe. For till there be granted an end of mans life, the mutation of the temperature by decay of nature may well be doubted of, foraſmuch as a *ſucceſſive impayring alwayes importeth a finall diſſolution.*

Chap. II.

God onely is Eternall. The Angels and ſoules of men are eternall. The creation of Angels is inclusively ſet downe by Moſes; not expreſly, and why. Other things have

both beginning, and ending. The divers acceptions of the words (World) and Eternall: being declared, the queſtion is ſtated thus: Whether the Heavens and Earth, with the bodily Creatures therin contayned, had a beginning, or ſhall have an ending.

3 FIrſt therefore, touching the continuance of the *world*, whether as it had a *beginning*, ſo it ſhall have an *end*, or rather whether it ever had *beginning*, or ſhall have an *end* of being. *Dionyſius* in his booke *de Divinis nominibus*, diſtinguiſheth things that are, according the difference of their indurance, the diſtinction is after this ſort. The whole number of things, how many and divers ſoever, may bee ſummarily compriſed under

under theſe three ſeverall heades. There are ſome things, or rather there is one thing *Eternall*, which neyther had *beginning*, nor ſhall have *end*, and ſuch is *God* alone, who only being immutable, ſubject to none, no not the leaſt alteration, is therefore only from everlaſting to everlaſting, for that cauſe termed in holy Writ, the *Ancient of dayes*: amongſt the old *Ægyptians*, reſembled to a *decrepit-old-man*: and pourtrayed like a *youth* in the prime of his flouriſhing yeeres: by that firſt *Image* ſignifying his long continuance from before; by the ſecond, his liveline ſſe and immunity from all maner defect and alteration by cancred corrupting time. For as his power is infinite, extended not onely to all things in the world, but even unto things which are not: as firſt, hee made all things of nothing, as his greatneſſe is unmeaſurable, not limited or bounded

ded by any place or compaſſe; and therefore ſayde to have his *centrum ubique*, from which the *eſſence* of all things is drawne, as *lines*, and where they end and are all conjoyned, and his *circumference no where*: finally, as all his attributes are *infinite*, and immeaſurable, ſo is his continuance altogether boundleſſe. Wherefore not to enter at all into this inextricable *Labyrinth* of *Gods* continuance, let us proceed unto the next part of the diſtinction. Beſide *God*, who is onely *Eternall*, there are other things in a middle degree; tearmed by the moderne *Philoſophers*, *Eviternall*, having *beginning* from *God*, the fountayne of *being*, yet without *end*, eyther of *annihilation*, or *corruption*: ſuch are all ſpirituall creatures, *Angels*, and the *Soules* of men. Where notwithſtanding there is a doubt to bee anſwered: for in the whole *Hiſtory* of the *Creation* recorded by

by *Moſes*, we finde no mention of the making of Angels, nor any word of them till the narration of the *Womans* treacherous ſeduction by the *divel* in the *ſerpent*, ſo that eyther they were not *created*, and ſo were from everlaſting, or elſe *Moſes* his *Chronicle* is in this point defective. But we may well anſwer, that they had a beginning, ſeeing that *Eternity* is *Gods* peculiar *attribute*, and the ſame, though inclu-ſively, expreſſed by *Moſes* in his booke of *beginnings*: for by heaven is ſignified, not onely the body of hea-ven, but the things alſo therein con-tayned. Now of the indirect, and in-cluſive mention made of theſe admira-ble creatures, there may this reaſon be given: The men of thoſe times being very ſuperſtitious, and given unto I-dolatry, (for the *Ægyptians* even at that time worſhipped the *Sunne*, and the *hoſts of Heaven*) *Moſes* fearing to give

give new occaſion to their falſe *Will-worſhip*, of purpoſe refrayned from expreſſe mentioning of their names, or natures, in his *hiſtory*. For if theſe bodily viſible creatures, wrung from them ſuch divine worſhip, the *Angels*, by how much more excellent their nature is, would have ſo much the more added new fewell to their begun fire of ſuperſtition: Secondly, leſt the detractory nature of corrupted man, ſhould have aſcribed ſome part of the glory of the worlds creation to thoſe heavenly Creatures, the wiſe penman of this moſt excellent Story, of purpoſe concealed what he knew, eyther of their *Creation* or Nature: ſo that *Moſes* his hiſtory is in this regard not defective, howſoever giving no expreſſe notion of the creation of *Angels*. Neyther are the *Angels*, though moſt excellent *creatures*, voyd of beginning, there being but one thing, which

which one made all things, of it ſelfe, *Eternall.* The third degree is of thoſe things, that had both beginning with *time*, and ſhall have their ende in *time*; ſuch are all bodily creatures, as well ſimple, as mixt, although touching the celeſtiall bodies, there bee ſome doubt.

4 Now as concerning the *World*, the queſtion is, to which of theſe three kinds, it may and ought be referred. And I finde three ſeverall opinions. The firſt is, of them that make the *world eternall*, wanting *beginning*, and incapable of *end*. The ſecond, of them that grant both *beginning* and *end of being*. There is a third Sect that parts theſe two opinions, affirming, that it had a *beginning*, and ſhall have no *end*. But leſt we ſticke in the wordes, let us in one word or two, ſet downe the ſenſe and meaning of the *Queſtion*; and becauſe that *error* is the child of *confu-*

ſion,

ſion, diſtinguiſh the things doubtfull, leſt through the equivocation of the words, by miſtaking, wee come unto a contrary ſenſe. By the *World* therfore, ſometime is meant the whole compaſſe of things that are, as well ſpirituall as bodily, extended in this ſenſe even unto God himſelfe. Secondly, it is taken for all things, onely *God* excepted, even the whole worke of the *Creation*, excluding no creature how excellent ſoever, no not the *angels*. Thirdly, it ſignifieth onely the circuit of bodily *creatures*, whether you interpret bodily things to bee ſuch as have bodies as parts of them, or ſuch as, though in regard of compoſition have no bodies, yet have their being onely in creatures bodily, as thoſe things which wee call *Accidents*. For the firſt acception it concerneth not our purpoſe. For *Nature* it ſelfe excludeth *God* from all kinde of *beginning*, and it

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is a principle both in reaſon, and in religion, that *God is from Everlaſting*. In the ſecond ſenſe wee may take it, comprehending all things both ſpirituall and bodily: for even the *Angels*, as is before ſayd, had their *beginning* by *creation*: but we rather hold our ſelves unto the laſt ſignification, as being moſt uſually meant by thoſe that handle this controverſie. And this alſo according to its threefold conſideration, hath three ſeverall acceptations. For firſt, it is taken for that *Idea* and type preconceived of the *Maker*, *God* by which he was ruled and directed in the building thereof. And this is termed by *Plato*, the *Ideal* or *exemplary world*, as it were the *copy* which *God* followed in the Creation: whereby if he underſtand *Gods decree* to create, wee may without errour entertayne it; otherwiſe it is ſomewhat harſh: for we are not to imagine that *God* needeth any

ny long premeditate or foreconceived type of his workes, as our finite artificers doe; but as his wisedome, and power is infinite, so doth he, in an unutterable manner at the same moment, devise the manner, and performe the worke; and yet, not rashly, but most wisely, and with great deliberation. For as hee sayd in another sense, so may I say in this case, *One day with God is as a thousand yeeres, and a thousand yeeres as one day*; length of time adding nothing to his ability and wisedome, nor fewnesse of dayes, any way detracting from the perfection of his workmanship. Secondly, it is taken for the *university* of things contayned within the compasse and cope of heaven and earth, now really and actually subsisting; and this is called of *Plato*, the *world reall*, as having an actuall and externall being in *Nature*, not onely in conceit and intention. Thirdly, man

is

is called the *Leſſer world*, in regard of that perfect analogie and ſimilitude, betwixt him and this greater World, wherein there is nothing whoſe likeneſſe and reſemblance may not bee ſeene in man: and this you may call the *Analogicall World*: Now by the world in our queſtion, we principally underſtand, the frame of all things in heaven and in earth: leſſe principally *Man*, as being but a part therof. As for the other terme, namely *Eternall*, that alſo hath two acceptions; for things are ſayd to be *Eternall* two waies: Firſt improperly, that which never ſhall have end, more fitly called *Eviternall* or *Immortall*. Properly that is ſayd to be *Eternall*, which neyther had beginning, nor ſhall have end; nor as *Boethius* addeth, 'any *ſucceſſion*. Now *Eternall*, wee take in the more proper and later ſenſe. So that the *Queſtion* may thus more plainely be expreſſed, *Whether*

ther the heavens and earth, with the bodily Creatures therein contayned, had a beginning, or shall have an end of being.

Chap. III.

Aristotles *opinion, concerning the worlds Eternitie* ex parte ante; *is grounded upon an affected singularitie.* Democritus *his opinion that the world is Eternall, and made by Fortune, refuted by severall Arguments. The opinion of* Strato, *that the world was made by Nature Examined. Of Universall, and Particular Nature. Universall Nature can be nothing but God.* Scaligers *Sen-*

Sentence, concerning Nature, and Fortune.

5 BUt becauſe that part of the opinion which concerneth the Worlds eternity, *à parte ante*, as the *Schoole-men* ſpeake; that is, its being from everlaſting, is not ſo directly pertinent unto our purpoſe, wee will with all poſſible brevity, run over the ſpeciall reaſons, and foundations thereof, the rather becauſe the Authors and mayntayners thereof from the want of *beginning*, inferre the uncapableneſſe of an *end*. Now the chiefe *Patron* and defender of this opinion in regard of authority, though not of time, was *Ariſtotle*, who, as I take it, rather affecting ſingularity, than for any ſoundneſſe of the matter or ſtrength of Argument, taught it in his *Licæum*. For the *Philoſophers* which lived before him, with generall conſent agreed in

the contrary opinion: *Triſmegiſtus*, who with his Learning watered the then barren Country of *Greece*, as *Diodorus Siculus* witneſſeth in his firſt book of *Antiquities*, *Muſæus*, *Orpheus*, *Linus*, *Epicharmus*, *Heſiodus*, and *Homer*, amongſt the Poets; *Zoroaſtes*, *Anaxagoras*, *Meliſſus*, *Empedocles*, *Pherecides*, *Philolaus*, *Democritus*, and *Plato*, as *Philo Iudæus*, *Laertius Diogenes*, *Sulpitius Severus*, *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis*, *Plutarch*, and *Tully* witneſſe, which alſo his bookes intituled *Timæus*, and *Critias*, together with thoſe *De Republica* do teſtifie. Onely *Ariſtotle* in a ſelfe-conceit of ſingularity, howſoever elſewhere honouring antiquity, rather liketh in this caſe a new broched opinion of his owne, contrary to ſo many foregoing *Philoſophers*: and therefore *Hicrophantes*, a devout, though Idolatrous *Prieſt*, condemned him of arroganc yand ſelfelove, not only becauſe,

contrar

contrary to the common receyved opinion of his Countrey, continued so many ages ungaynsayd, he denied the *plurality of Gods*, but also, and much more for that hee stucke not to teach that the World was from everlasting, which all *Greece* confessed to have had beginning in time.

6 But to fetch the beginning of this phantasticall opinion somewhat higher, wee will begin with *Democritus*, the Arch-patron of *Fortune*, who will have the Worlde eternall, and withall chanceable: but Eternity and Chance, being (as the learned Sir *Philip* obserued) things unsufferable together; If Chanceable, then not Eternall. Againe, what is more absurde, then to thinke the World was made by the untended and casuall concourse of indivisible substances? for whence came these substances? If you say they came from Everlasting, and so

were Eternall, can you conceive ſuch chanceable effects to proceed from ſo certayne and neceſſary cauſes? Nay rather, if you will needes mayntayne the infiniteneſſe of theſe diminutive bodies, grant they had beginning from that Infinite One that glued the Infinite parts of your *Infinite, All,* together, by his unmeaſurable *Power* and *Wiſedome.* For can wee imagine ſuch a perfect *Order* and *Stability* to conſiſt in theſe diſioyned ſubſtances? *Order* and *Conſtancy* are children onely of *Wiſedome*: and ſooner may wee proove *Darkneſſe* to proceed from the *Sunne*, than *Conſtancy* and *Order* from inconſtant chance, conſtant in nothing but in *Inconſtancy.* Finally, wee muſt eyther exclude Gods *Wiſedome* and prouident care of the *World* made, or elſe *Fortune* from making of the *World:* (for the *World* is Gods poſſeſſion, only by right of *Creation*) unleſſe wee imagine

gine a *deed of gift* passed by *Fortune* at her death: or *Fortune* the true *Owner*, (if the true *Maker*) disinherited, and by violence driven out of her dominion by *God* as an *Vsurper*. But *God* having nothing to plead for his title unto his kingdome, but the right of *Creation*, if that plea bee improoved, God cannot any longer call the *World* his owne, and therefore without cruelty may cast off all care of this his supposed off-spring. For it is onely Gods *Fatherhood*, that bindes him unto his *Providence*.

7 Therefore not to stay long in this opinion of *Fortune*, let us now come unto *Nature*, deified especially by *Strato*, a *Naturalist*: who fearing to oversway God with the weight of this burthen, eyther in the making, or governing of the *world*, hath granted him a *Remedy*, or *Otium*, as they tearme it, thinking it more reason that God

ſhould have an exemption from trouble, then Gods *Prieſts*, who for his ſake be diſpenſed withall. But let us ſee, what this *Nature* may be, ſo highly by *Strato* magnified. There is a *particular Nature*, and there is a *generall* or *univerſall Nature*. The particular is, that which in every ſeverall ſingle *ſubſtance* miniſtreth *Eſſence* to the whole *compound*: and withall, is *authour* of ſuch action and motion, as is agreeable to the ſubject wherein it is; as the *nature* of *fire*, cauſeth the *fires* aſcention; the *nature* of *earth*, the *earths* going downward: and in regard of this *Nature*, we ſay, It is *Naturall* to the *fire* to aſcend, to the *earth* to deſcend, the bodies having in them, even of themſelves, by their inherent forme, a promptneſſe, and inclination unto theſe motions. Now if by the conſpiring of theſe many and manifold *Natures*, this *All*, wee now ſpeake of, were made, as if the

Elements

Elements and *Ethereall* parts ſhould in their *towne-houſe* ſet downe the bounds of every ones office; then conſider what followeth, that there muſt needs have beene, a wiſedome overruling power, which made them concur: for their natures being ſo divers and contrary, would rather have wrought each others deſtruction, than ſo friendly have conſorted, to make up ſo unexpreſſeable an harmony. For to grant *knowledge* unto them whereby to moderate the extremity of their naturall fury, or intendment of ſuch agreement, were to enter into a bottomleſſe pit of abſurdities, ſeeing that *knowledge* alway preſuppoſeth *reaſon*, and *reaſon* ſenſe: both which are never found, eyther joyntly, or in part, in bodily ſenſeleſſe creatures. Now touching the *Vniverſall Nature*, which ſome will have to be nothing, but *an influent vertue helping and furthering the actions of every*

every particular naturall body, others, an *Vniverſall overruling*, and as it were, *an Ideal Nature ſubſiſting*. For as the particular nature of every particular *body*, cauſeth and mayntayneth the particular *actions* of the body wherein it is; ſo this generall Nature is the Authour and mayntayner of all *actions* and *bodies*; to which, the ſingle ſeverall bodies are in ſubjection, by their obedience, acknowledging a kinde of ſuperiority, in that nature which we call *univerſall*. And in the reſpect of this Nature, the fire is ſayd, in ſome caſes, to goe downeward by Nature, as to hinder the *diſcontinuity* of things in the world, and ſo, that *emptines* which nature ſo much abhorreth. Now, if by this univerſall nature, they underſtand a nature of *wiſedome*, and *goodneſſe*, and *providence*, which with *knowledge* performeth its actions, and ſo of purpoſe, and deliberately hath knit together

theſe

theſe ſo many poynts to ſuch an excellent *unity*; this Nature wee reject not, but retayne, as that *God* and *Maker* of all things, that by his infinite irreſiſtable power hath conjoyned the diſagreeing parts of this viſible Worlde, and of things contrary, made a perfect harmony, permitting in their nature a mutuall reſiſtance; yet ſo, as they hinder not their friendly copulation in the worlds compoſition. In ſumme, touching *Nature* and *Fortune*, they are thus onely (ſayth *Scaliger*) to be interpreted: that *Nature* ſignifies *Gods* ordinary power; and thus, things *extraordinary* may be called *unnaturall*: *Fortune* his unrevealed *will*, and thus may we call things *chanceable*, that are beſide *expectation*, or beyond *reaſon*.

Chap.

Chap. IV.

Epicurus *his ſcoffing argument, concerning* Platoes *eye, & Gods tools and fellow-workmen, anſwered. The Atheiſts Scoffe, asking where God was, and what he did before he made the world, aptly returned upon them by a Father: anſweared more ſeriouſly then the words import by ſome Ieweiſh Rabbins, and ſoundly by the Chriſtian Philoſophers: their arguments about ſuch Creatures as are noyſom to Man anſwered, by a ſhort declaration of Gods providence.*

Now

8 NOw touching the *Epicure*, who (as *Tully* ſayth) derived his opinion from *Democritus*, we will in one word anſwer his reaſon, recorded by *Tully* in his ſecond Booke *De Natura Deorum*, and ſo come unto *Ariſtotle*, and his *Scholer* the Atheiſt. The *Epicures* reaſon is briefly thus compounded by way of interrogation: What eyes (ſayth hee in his ſcoffing impudency) had *Plato*, to behold the framing of this ſo great a worke? Or what tooles, and fellow-workemen had *God* to make the *World* withall? The Anſwer is, that *Plato* his eye, was the eye of *reaſon*, gathering by neceſſary conſequence, both the being of the Deity, as alſo confuſedly apprehending the infiniteneſſe of *God*, his *power* and *wiſedome* ſhining in the *World*, as in a moſt cleere glaſſe reflecting in ſome ſort, the *Image* of *Gods* inviſable

inviſible *Nature*, upon the eyes of all the beholders. Touching abſence of inſtruments and fellowe-workemen, whereby the *Epicure* would inferre the impoſſibility to create in *God*, wee are not to thinke that *God, infinite in power*, is tyed to the helpe of ſecondary inſtrumentall cauſes, they being but ſupplies of defects, and helps of wants, in the otherwiſe inſufficient agents: and therefore not requiſite to the eternall infiniteneſſe of *Gods* ability. Nay we may adde further, which is *Gods* priviledge, *God* of *nothing*, is powerfull enough to make *all* things, much more without inſtruments. Now a poſſibility of *creating* in God, may thus briefly be ſhewne: according to the maner of *being* of every thing, ſo alſo is the order of *working*; but *Gods being* and *beginning* dependeth upon nothing but himſelfe: why then ſhould it be thouht impoſſible, that *Gods* action is not tyed unto

unto any matter? And indeed, the reaſon (as far as I can perceive) why other things require a ſubject whereon to worke, is onely the impotency of the *Agents*; but *God All-ſufficient*, and powerfull, who can out of the *Rockes* bring *water*, out of *darkeneſſe light*, can alſo (as he hath done) make *all* things of *nothing*. Another reaſon may bee this, taken from the difference of the principall *efficients*, *God*, *Nature*, *Art*. *Art*, alway preſuppoſeth a thing *really ſubſiſting*; *Nature* onely a *matter* with a *power to be God* (a farre more powerful *Agent* then eyther *Art* or *Nature*) is able, of that which is *nothing* at all, to make a thing of actuall and reall ſubſiſtence. For, if *Nature* can of a thing in the loweſt degree of being, and next to a not being, make a thing actually ſubſiſting, *God All-ſufficient*, and *infinite in power*, can of *nothing* create any thing in what degree of being ſoever.

Now

9 Now touching the Atheiſt, out of *Ariſtotle* his *Philoſophie*, hee hath drawne this ſubtile *Interrogatory*, which hee propoundeth with ſo unſavory ſcorne: If the *world* were not from Everlaſting, but made by the God you talke of, I would know of you, where he lived before the time that hee made the world; how he buſied himſelfe all the time before? For it is an abſurdity, even among us, to ſay, he was *idle*; as alſo what he did, if hee did not make it from everlaſting? Touching the place of his being, and the manner of his worke, I may not unfitly anſwer, as a learned Father of the *Primitive Church* did unto the ſame demand; *He was in a Wood providing Fewell for that fire, which ſhould in Hell torment ſuch curious priers into matters beyond their reache.* But for his *location*, I may thus more fitly anſwer: that *Goa* is tyed to no *place*, being in all *places* to fill them with his good.

goodneſſe, in no *place* to be circumſcribed by the *circumference*. Touching his action we anſwer, that howſoever the externall work, (the after-fruit of his externall working) had no externall ſenſible being, yet was hee not unoccupied, his very decreeing being an action, and that alſo having relation unto the creatures, which ſhould afterward have being. The *Hebrewes* (who many times do but trifle in matters of weight) give unto this queſtion an anſwer, ſaying, that God to keepe himſelfe unoccupied, ſpent that time in trifling experiments; now making a world on this faſhion, now on that; then by and by diſſolving his looſe and diſpleaſing worke; at length by many trials, to have light upon this *world*, and this *faſhion*, which for his conceived liking, he eſtabliſhed. But theſe learned *Rabbins*, meant a more ſerious matter then their words beare ſhew of: and that

was, that God did not rashly, nor without great deliberation make the world on this fashion rather then any other; and that he saw he might have made it many other wayes, and sooner, and more worlds, but would not: alluding, as I take it, to *Gods* councell-taking, at the decree, touching the time & maner of the worlds creation, which was the sum of our first given answer. But more soundly and to the purpose we answer, that the actions of the *Deity* are of two sorts, *immanent* and *internall*: or *externall* and *transeunt*: the *immanent* actions are those which be in the *Deitie* from one *person* unto another, as to love together, and such like: the *transeunt* actions are those that passe from the *Godhead*, to some externall object: they may both bee thus illustrated. As in the element of *fire* there is a faculty of heating and enlightning, whence procedeth heate and light unto the externall neere bodyes,

bodyes, and beſide this faculty there is alſo in it a naturall power to go upward, which when it commeth into *act*, is received in no other ſubject but the *fire* it ſelfe: ſo that, if *fire* could by abſtractive imagination be conceived of, as wanting theſe two *tranſeunt* operations, yet could we not juſtly ſay it had no *action*, foraſmuch as it might move upward, which is an immanent an inward action. So, and much more ſo, though we grant that there was no exernall worke of the *Godhead*, vntill the making of the world, yet can there be no neceſſary illation of *Idleneſſe*, ſeeing it might have, (as indeede it had) actions immanent included in the circle of the Trinity. Again, thus reaſon theſe blaſphemous Atheiſts againſt the truth: If for mans ſake *God* made the world, and all things therein, how commeth it to paſſe, that there are in the world ſo many noyſome creatures, as Vipers

and ſuch like, which procure rather our annoyance, than ſerve any way for our uſe and benefit? For to ſay they are chanceable or of a voluntary and ſelfe procreation, is (in our Philoſophy) abſurd, eſpecially, ſeeing we extend *Gods power*, and *providence* unto very *flyes* and ſuch like creatures. But we may anſwer, firſt that there is nothing ſo cumberſome, which is not ſome way ſerviceable. Or if now diſobedient, yet not ſo created, but, for mans rebellion againſt God, permitted or rather directed to arme themſelues againſt him, for whoſe uſe and helpe they were created: like unto that ſword, which *Hector* gave *Ajax*, which ſo long as hee uſed againſt men his enemies, ſerved for his helpe and defence; but after that he began to uſe it, or rather abuſe it, to the hurt of hurtleſſe beaſts, it turned into his owne bowels. For untill the tranſgreſſion, *Adam* lived as Lord of the creatures,

creatures, having now the moſt dangerous and pernicious creatures under him in ſubjection. For the devill, that ſubtill Seducer, was not ſo ſimple a ſot, as to make choice of the ſerpent to beguile him with inticements if he had knowne, or but ſuſpected any reſident feare in man of the ſerpent, by ſome foregoing remembred miſchiefe; for that had beene rather to terrifie him from all attention, then any way to allure him to follow his counſell. So that, all things which now are unto corrupted man moſt cumberſome, as puniſhments of his diſloialty, were by creation ordained for his furtherance. Nor need they wonder, that *Gods* power and knowledge ſhould ſtretch it ſelfe unto flyes and ſuch diminitive Creatures, as they tearme them: nay it is far more inſenſible, that the eſtate of flyes ſhould be unknown unto him, for that were to bound the infinitnes of his knowledge.

Chap. V.

God is acknowledged by Aristotle.

The first Argument of the Peripateticks concerning the worlds eternitie, answeared two wayes. There is a twofould potentiall being: one that hath not any thing in or of it selfe but is vertually contained in the abilitie of some thing which may give it a reall being: Thus the worla was potentially from everlasting: The second is in that which hath an actuall and a real subsistance though separated from its efficient cause yet wanteth

teth ſomething, of which it is capable; Thus the world had no potentiall being from eternitie The axiome, that eve y making preſuppoſeth a matter, anſwered two wayes: by the way of making and condition or qualities of the Agents: two ſorts of making, and two ſorts of Agents. It is an infirmity in the maker not to bee able to make a thing without matter. The third Argument grounded upon a ſuppoſall of two abſurdities, either a proceſſe in infinitum, or a contradiction fully anſweared; by the grant of a Creation and diſtinction of the efficient into theſe two kinds efficiens per tranſmutati-

nem, *and* efficiens per emanationem, *the laſt being proper to God.*

10 BUt to leave the profeſſed Atheiſt, who though from *Ariſtotle* his Schoole he ſucked his noiſome error, yet went far beyond *Ariſtotle* in impiety: For *Ariſtotle* (at leaſt in words) confeſſed Gods being, and infinitenes, which alſo he went about to prove and confirme by reaſon, whereas theſe godleſſe Heretikes doe not onely deny both in their works, and by conſequence of words, but even ſhameleſly with direct ſpeeches, not onely his *omnipotency*, but even his very *being*: let us therefore come to *Ariſtotle* and his leſſe profane followers. The *Peripateticks* principall and moſt cunning and ſubtile argument, which alſo they urge with greateſt vehemency

cy is briefly this; ſay they, eyther the world was from everlaſting, or elſe made anew, proceeding from not being, unto this being which now it hath. But it was not made a new; for then eyther it proceeded from a power and fitneſſe which it had to be unto this actuall being, or elſe it was made of nothing. If before it was actually ſubſiſting, it had a being potentiall from everlaſting (ſeeing things that are potentially, though in the baſeſt degree of being, yet are not meerely nothing) it followeth, that it alwayes was (at leaſt potentially) and ſo eternall. If we ſay that it was made of nothing, that is (in their Philoſophy) an abſurd impoſſibility. For it is with them a principle not queſtionable, *That every making preſuppoſeth a Subject.* Now if we obiect, that the neceſſary preſence of a reall ſubject dependeth only upon the Makers infirmity, and imperfection:

ction: they answer, *that* the disability of doing impossibilities is not defect or imbecility. To which sayd argument of theyrs (as they would have it) there may bee a double answer given. For first, we affirme that the world proceeded, from not being to being. To the proposition of their prosyllogisme we answer by deniall thereof, and reject their distinction as sophisticall, putting contrariety (the greatest opposition) betwixt things, not onely agreeing, but even all one. For there is a potentiall being, incident to things that are not at all, and therefore doe the Schoolemen distinguish of the potentiall being, after this manner: A thing (say they) may bee sayd to have a potentiall beeing two wayes: first, that is sayd to be potentially which is not yet either in whole, or in part subsisting in nature, which having no reall, or actuall cause of being,

ing, may notwithſtanding afterward have a true cauſe of its eſſence and exiſtence. So that it is not any thing, in, or of it ſelfe, but is vertually contained within the abilyty of ſome thing, that may afterward bring it unto a true and reall being. As for example, there is a potentiall being of more worlds then one, inaſmuch as God by his unreſiſtable power, is able, as well to make more worlds, as he was to create this one world which we behould and inhabite: yet, who will ſay, that there are more worlds then one, eyther totally or partially, really and truly now being in nature? Indeed it is a thing within the compaſſe of Gods omnipotency, to bring in a multiplicity of worlds, and therefore wee may not untruly ſay, that this multiplicity of worlds hath a being potentiall. So likewiſe, who will deny, that a man ſound and without maime or lacke of his

his limmes, that never ſet foot over his threſhold, hath power (with ſuppoſition of health and ſtrength) to travell over the whole circuit of the countrey; yet is it abſurd to ſay, that this journey of his is any way in nature, eyther wholly or in part. Secondly, that may juſtly and is more properly ſayd to be potentially, that having an actuall and reall ſubſiſting, even ſeperate from it efficient cauſe wherein it was before vertually contayned, yet lacketh ſomewhat, which by nature it is capable of. A child altogether unlettered, may juſtly be ſayd to be potentially diſpoſed towards the receit of Learning, inaſmuch as it hath a reaſonable Soule, which is alway accompanied with a capacity of learning. To apply this diſtinction unto our purpoſe, we ſay that to be potentially in the firſt degree, is indeed to be nothing; becauſe this potentiall being is a meere not being: and

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ſo was the world from everlaſting, having ſuch an ability and capableneſſe (that I may ſo ſpeak) of being, foraſmuch as God by his omnipotency was from everlaſting powerfull enough to create the world, as in time he did actually make the ſame.

Now for that other kinde of potentiall being, incident unto things onely that have received an actuall being from their cauſes, it was in that rude *Chaos* created by God, the firſt day of the begun-making of the world, and was afterward perfected in the worke of diſtinction, (as the Schoole-men call it) when God out of that confuſion, or rather upon that rude lumpe, brought this admirable variety and difference of creatures, for the ornament of the world: for that the world was in this ſort potentially only at the creation of the firſt matter, which was in the time by *Moſes* mentioned. Secondly

condly wee anſwer, that it is not impoſſible for God of nothing to make things really and truely ſubſiſting, as we before proved. To their *Axiome* or principle, which they call Undeniable, wee anſwer, that there is a twofold faction or making: One naturall, incident to Creatures, commonly called Generation; the other ſupernaturall, the priviledge of God himſelfe, which we terme Creation. Now every making which is a Generation, requireth a really-being ſubject becauſe it is either a motion or mutation which ſuppoſeth a matter wherein it is receyved: but the making of Creation, is alway without any matter ſubject, being defined to be, *A making ſomething of nothing*. But theſe adverſaries admit of no ſuch duplicity of making, holding it a meere impoſſibility for any Agent in this ſort to create: Thus therefore ſomewhat otherwiſe we anſwer:

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There be two ſorts of Agents or Efficients; the one Univerſall, the other Particular or Partiall. They differ thus: That the efficient univerſall is cauſe of the whole being and eſſence of it effect, making both matter and forme; and this action of this Agent, is not Motion or Mutation, but a bare Emanation. The particular Agent is not cauſe of the whole eſſence of that it maketh: ſeeing it alway requireth the preexiſtence of the matter, and the action thereof is truely called Motion or Mutation. So then it is impoſſible for a partiall or halfe efficient, as you may terme him, to worke or make a thing of nothing; but for an univerſal, it is not onely poſſible, but even eaſie. And is it not thinke you, (to anſwer every point of their reaſon) an infirmity in the Maker, not to be able to make a thing without matter? For why is the exiſtence of the matter neceſſary, but

but because the efficient can doe nothing: and doeth not this import a defect of the workmans ability? No, say the adversaries, for it is no imperfection to bee unable to doe things impossible: but we deny that this is unpossible unto any, but unto particular agents naturall; as for God to whom nothing is impossible, but to deny himselfe, as he is the whole and sole cause of being, so is he able even from a not being, to bring things to the highest and most excellent degree of being. Secondly, say they, unlesse wee grant an ever being of motion, wee must needs admit eyther of a proceeding *in infinitum*, or else of this senseleſſe *contradiction*, that before the first motion there was a motion more ancient: two maine absurdities; the one in reason, the other in nature. For the progresse *in infinitum*, they thinke it is thus proved; for before the motion, whereby the first moved

moved body was made, there was of neceſſity requiſite ſome potentiall being thing, becauſe that motion is only incident unto things of a potentiall exiſtence. If that be granted, then they inferre that there was ſome motion whereby this ſubject had it being, and ſo *in infinitum*. But to ſtop their long journey, wee may hinder this infinite proceeding by granting a Creation. It is true indeed, that there muſt needes be a thing capable of motion, before there can be any moving: for in every motion there is a thing moving, and a thing moved; but there is no neceſſity that this moveable ſhould have its being by motion; for it was made by Creation, which was no motion, but a ſimple and bare emanation: For there is a two-fold mediate action, whereby a cauſe is ſayd to worke, according to which duplicity of action, they have thus diſtinguiſhed of cauſes

efficient. There is, ſay the Schoolemen, a double efficient, or workinge cauſe, one called *Efficiens per tranſmutationem*, that is, ſuch a cauſe, whoſe operation is alway joyned with ſome change in the thing working, according as is the reſiſtance, eyther of the body betweene it, and the patient, or of the thing whereon hee worketh, which doeth more or leſſe withſtand his impreſſion. The other is, *Efficiens per emanationem*, as when without any repugnancy of any patient or labour of the agent, the effect or worke doth voluntarily and freely ariſe from the action of the working cauſe: as the ſhadow from the body: ſuch is God, whoſe unreſiſtable power by his bare word of command, even of nothing made this admirable worke of the World, as the ſhadow and obſcure repreſentation of his wiſedome and omnipotency: not changed in his nature, there being nothing

thing by *Reaction* to imprint any thing in the impaſſionable *Godhead.* And this is the full and ſufficient anſwer to the ſecond argument.

Chap. VI.

The relation betwixt the eternall mover, and the thing to be moved, proveth not the eternity of the world, becauſe there is an abſolute being in God, *and his exiſtence dependeth not upon the creatures. There was no impediment which made* God *deferre the creation but his owne determinate purpoſe to doe it at the time appointed. Two reaſons, why he deferred the creation ſo long. He could have*

done it ſooner by his abſolute power, but not by his conditionall, which regardeth his decree. The purpoſe of God from eternity was to create the world, but not to have it Coeternall with himſelfe. The creation ſheweth no alteration, or change in God, but perfection, in that thereby he actuated that which was before determined. The Soules of men not traduced, but created. Origens *error. An excellent ſaying of* Hugo de Sancto Victore.

THirdly, they reaſon thus: There is an eternall mover, therefore there hath been an eternall motion and thing mooved, in aſmuch as theſe

theſe relatives cannot be but together in nature. For anſwer whereto we muſt remember, that there is an abſolute, both conſideration, and being of God. Abſolute I ſay and out of relation, o-otherwiſe Gods being ſhould be only in relation. It is true indeed, that relatives are alway together in nature beginning to be, and finiſhing their being, in one and the ſame moment. For inſtance, a father is not a father untill he have a ſonne, nor is he a father longer then he hath a ſonne. And yet for all that thoſe things which are Relatives, may have being, one before another, though not as Relatives, yet as things really ſubſiſting in nature. For example, who can deny that *Adam* was in nature, before either conception or birth of his blody ſonne *Cain*? yet was he not father till God had bleſſed him with that after-curſed off-ſpring. And who ſeeth not, that the Carpenter had

being in Nature, before he builds the houſe, although he be no actuall builder till the houſe be in making? So God that was from everlaſting before all times, had his being without motion, though not as a mover, yet as a thing really and perfectly exiſting; but when in fullneſſe of time (according to the free determined purpoſe of his will) he began the frame of the world, then began he alſo to be a Relative, a builder in reſpect of this goodly houſe and palace, in the world; *a Father*, that is, the Beginning of being unto the Childe of the Creation, the image of his *greatneſſe*; and indeed, in theſe and ſuch kind of controverſies, we muſt warily uſe theſe termes of relation, eſpecially in regard of the Creatures, leſt we binde God onely unto a relative being, and ſo make his exiſtence dependent on the Creatures.

Their fourth argument is in ſubſtance this

this: if God ſo long before had being without being a Creator, there was doubtleſſe ſome defect in the foregoing time, the ſupply wherof in the moment of creation moved him to make the world rather at that time then any other. For there is no new action but preſuppoſeth ſome new incitement, which moved the Agent to undertake the worke, more then before; but there could bee nothing at this time more than before, that could move God the principall and perfecteſt workeman, to take in hand this buſineſſe and worke rather now, than before; for then how could he be the primary and principall cauſe? But this in ſhort may bee the anſwer; Indeed there was all this time an impediment, foraſmuch as God would not actually create, untill the time foreappointed in his ſecret purpoſe was accompliſhed. Nay, but ſay the adverſaries, God un-

till this time was indifferent to create, or not to create, therefore there was in the instant of the Creation some thing that restrained this his indifferency. But we may answer, that there was no such indifferency, (as they talke of,) God having from all eternity, purposely determined at this time to begin the worke of the Creation. So that unto the fore-mentioned demand of the Atheist, why God deferred the creating of the world untill this moment of time, we may answer, that of the choise of this time, rather than any other, for this his worke, there can no other reason be given, but his most freewill, that in his decree of Creation restrained, and bound it selfe to this time, rather than unto any other. Now if they shall reply, that we are not to imagine Gods will unreasonable, and therefore no doubt there was some reason that moved him to this limitation of his will:

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we may anſwer, That we doe not deny but God had ſome reaſon (though not without himſelfe) of this his prorogation. Nay we may without offence, goe ſo farre, as to give ſome reaſon of this dilation, in generall; That God would not from everlaſting create the world, to ſhew the independency of his exiſtence in regard of the Creatures: as alſo, to give us to underſtand, that not for any hope of benefit, which ſhould proceed to him from the Creatures, he undertooke this worke: but rather (as it is the property of goodneſſe to communicate it ſelfe) out of the overflowing fountaine of his indefective *Goodnes*, to derive ſom commodity unto us his Creatures: for he that could ſo long be without vs, might without any inconveniency unto himſelfe, for ever have continued in that ſtate of *Lonelineſſe*. So that, of the deferring of the Creation, in generall, there may

may be a reason given; but why hee began at this time rather then at any other, either before or after, there is no other reason, but his owne free-will, knowne unto us, but heere ariseth a doubt, whether God could have begun sooner, or put off longer this worke of Creation.

The answer is, that hee could by his potential and absolute power; he could not by his actuall and conditionall.

For Gods power hath a twofould consideration, the one absolute, without regard of any his decrees whatsoever, whereby hee is able to doe all, even those things, that he will not; the other conditionall, ioyned with the consideration and respect of his will, whereby hee is able to doe all things which hee will, and onely those things which he will. God therefore

fore respected without his decree, was able, sooner or later to create the world; but if we consider him together with his purpose, he could not eyther have prevented, or deferred thishis intended worke of the Creation.

Nor do we hereby robbe God of his freedome, or bind him to any part of the contradiction, but if he be bound, sure he hath bound himselfe, having this Law onely prescribed him, that he deny not himselfe, that is indeed to take away his Godhead. But if God would not from everlasting make the world, how is hee not changed in his will? The answer is, that God would from everlasting make the world, but he would not make the world from everlasting, that is in playner tearmes: God had from everlasting a will to create the world, but it never was his will, that the world should have a coe-

ternall

ternall being with himſelfe; ſo that Gods will is ſtill the ſame altogether unalterd. But they further urge this argument, demanding how God by an everlaſting and old action of his will, could in time create the world anew, remaining himſelfe unchangeable. To which we may anſwer, that a continued action of his will, how antient ſoever, executing onely that which hee before intended, may well ſtand without admiſſion of alteration; as for example, if the purpoſe of my will to day, be to journy toward *London* the next weeke, which alſo according unto purpoſe I performe; will any man ſay my will is changed? In like ſort, *God* from everlaſting decreeing to create the world at ſuch a time, if at the time purpoſed this his decree be put in execution, is not thereby changed. Nay rather he is thereby to be thought more unchangeable, for as much as he performeth

meth that which before he did determine. Why but, say they, God is not freed from alteration, because that of a *Non-Creator*, hee was made a *Creator*. The answer is, that God was not hereby changed, albeit there was indeed some change (though improperly so called) when as the world proceeded from not being, unto being: for the succession of a being, after a not being, importeth some alteration, though not in the author of the new being, but rather in the thing that received that being; we shall make it plaine by this supposition. Let us imagine a vault or other close place, so fenced from the Sunne beames, that no light, not the least glimmering can pierce it, which afterward by digging or some such meanes, may have passage made through it, for the Sunnes accesse; would we say that the Sunne were by this meanes altered, because

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it inlightneth a place which before was full of darkeneſſe? Even ſo, and much more ſo, God the fountaine of Light, (whoſe *Spirit moving upon the Waters*, whereas before *there was darkneſſe upon the face of the deepe*, enlightned that darkneſſe, diſtinguiſhing, thoſe things which before were confuſedly mixed, or rather bringing them from *nothing*, to this their perfection) is not at all altered, but ſtill remayneth the ſame, ever unchangeable. And indeed, if ever new worke of God ſhould make him changeable, how ſhould he not be often changed, creating dayly the ſoules of new living men? For to ſay they have being before their ioyning unto the body, is plainly heriticall, and *Origen* was in that behalfe accuſed of a very groſſe error. Nor is it likely, nor yet indeed poſſible, they ſhould come by *traduction* or propagation from our Parents. For our Soules

Soules being as the Angels are, *Spirituall Substances*, are as farre from that ability of procreation, as the Angels are, those supernaturall celestiall Creatures; and there is the like reason for both. The Angels by reason of their Spirituality, are voyd and uncapable of procreation, mens Soules also being no lesse Spirituall than the Angels, are also unfit for procreation. Therefore one Soule begets not another, much lesse comes it of a corporal seed, it selfe being Spirituall. It remaines therefore that they are then a new created by god, and so coupled unto theyr bodies. Neyther is God for this cause changed, seeing as is aforesayd, hee doth now onely put in execution, that which beefore hee had in intention; and therefore (to conclude this whole argument, with that saying of *Hugo de Santo Victore*) *Gods will was Eternall, and the worke of his will was temporary*;

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for alwaies even from Eternity, he had a will to create the world, yet never was hee purposed to make the world from Everlasting, but his purpose and will was, to make that in time which he purposed before time to make in time. Therefore by his ever being goodnesse he for ever purposed: by his Eternall wisedome hee alway disposed that, which by his everlasting power hee once composed.

Chap. VII.

Time better defined then by Aristotle. *There is a perpetuall time, which is proper to* God, *and a momentary time incident to the Creature. A threefold* Nunc: Initiativum, Continuativum, & Determinativum. *There was*

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a time before the Creation. A time imaginary not reall. Ariſtotle *caught in his owne termes of Art. Two reaſons to prove that the world was not eternall* ex Parte Ante.

FIftly, they reaſon from the Eternity of time, in this ſort. Time is Eternall, therefore there is alſo an Eternall motion; for time is the meaſure of moving. Now the antecedent is thus proved: That which hath beene alway, and ſhall bee for ever, is Eternall; but ſuch is the condition of time: for you can deſigne us no moment or inſtant before which, Time was not, and after which, Time ſhall not remayne. For as *Ariſtotle* ſayth, every *now*, or inſtant of time is the end of time paſt, and beginning of time to

come: as in a right Line, every middle point is the end of the fore-part of the Line, and the beginning of the part following. To which we may answer by rejecting this their description of time, for (as *Scaliger* hath well observed) motion is rather the measure of time; and thence it is (as I take it) that *Plato* called the Sunne and Starres times Instruments, and as it were the *Iacobs staff* of time; because by their motion and circumvolution wee measure the indurance of the world. And therfore also as I conceive it, the Poets called *Saturne*, that is Time, Heavens Sonne, because that from their circular mooving, came the distinction of Dayes, and Moneths, and Yeeres. And to say the truth, there is a more generall, and true definition of times then this of *Aristotle*, and it is this: *The past, present and future indurance of things.* Which also the authors of this discription distinguish

ſtinguiſh into its kinds. There is, ſay they, a time perpetuall, or eternall, Gods owne peculiar attribute, who alone endureth from Generation to generation; and there is an indurance or time momentary, incident unto the Creatures. In this ſenſe therefore it is no abſurdity to ſay, there was a time when *Ariſtotles* time was not: for hee maketh time of the ſame age with the heavens motion; ſo that untill the heavens began to be moved, *Ariſtotles* time was not: yet there was time before the Heavens Creation, that is a long ſpace of indurance, in which God alone had being. But becauſe time is indeed proper unto the Creatures, being as (other bodily and ſpirituall Creatures) in Scripture ſayd to bee made by God, let us follow *Ariſtotle* in his owne Definition, and to his objection out of his *Schoole-Interpreters*, wee may fetch this anſwer; That every *Now*,

and inſtant of time is not both beginning of time to come and end of time paſt : for there is a threefold inſtant or *Now*. The firſt is *inſtans*, or *Nunc initiativum*, an inſtant only of beginning. The ſecond they tearme, *Nunc continuativum*, a continuing inſtant, and that is both beginning in reſpect of time following, and end in regard of time paſt. There is a third inſtant or moment, and that they call *Nunc finiens*, or *terminativum*, and that is ſuch an inſtant, as onely is an end of time foregoing : They may all be thus illuſtrated, as in a ſtraight line, the firſt pricke or point is onely the beginning of the line, the laſt point only the end of the ſame, the reſt in the middle are both, the end of that part of the Line which was before drawne, and the beginning of the hinder part. So in time we may point out an *inſtant* that is only *beginning*, another that is onely an *end*,

end, a third that is both a *beginning* and *end*. *Ariſtotle* his authority therefore can truely be underſtood onely of the continuing and coupling inſtant. But againſt this diſtinguiſhing anſwer, *Ariſtotle* hath this exception: If there be any ſuch *inſtant*, as is only a *beginning*, in reſpect of time following, and no end of that time which went before, then before this inſtant there was no time. What then? Therefore there was an *Ante*, without time, which is abſurd. For *Ante* and *Poſt*, *before* and *after*, are differences of time: As for example: When wee ſay *Philip* lived before *Alexander*, this word *Before*, ſignifies a difference in time, betwixt *Philip* and *Alexander* his ſonnes being. But who ſeeth not more ſubtilty then ſoundneſſe in this reply of *Ariſtotle*; for we will in like ſort thus reaſon againſt him. In his Phyſickes hee hath this poſition, *Extra cælum nullus eſt locus*.

cus : beyond Heaven there is no place; therefore, there is ſome *extra*, in which is no place. For *extra* and *intra*, *without* and *within*, are differences of place; as for example : when wee ſay hee is without doores, our meaning is, that he is in ſome place without the houſe. Now if we ſhould thus reaſon againſt *Ariſtotle* : There is out of Heaven a room or place to be in ; for *extra* without, is a difference of place, things being ſayd to be without, only in regard of place. But *Ariſtotle* ſayth *extra cælum*, therefore there is without the inward hollow compaſſe of heaven an externall out-roome : would hee not ſtraight, and that juſtly, reproove our Sophiſtry ? For *Ariſtotle* his meaning in that place is, that all things whatſoever are contayned within the inſide of the body of *Heaven* : and it is as if he had ſayd, there is no place, but within the inſide of the overcaſt circle of

Heaven.

Heaven. In like ſort, when wee ſay that before this firſt moment of the heavens motion, there was no time; our meaning is, that all reall time had beginning with the heavens moving. *Reall time*, I ſay; for there is *time* only imaginary, improperly called *time*, as being rather a part of Eternity, and of that indurance and long continuance, which wee conceive to have beene in God before the creation of the world. And thus ſhall we read the words, *Before*, and *After*, uſed among the Ancient Writers, both Chriſtian and Prophane: for ſo did *Ovid* uſe it in the beginning of his *Metamorphoſis*: *Ante mare & terras, & quod tegit omnia cœlum*: Before that heaven and earth were made. So in the Scripture: *Before the foundations of the world were laid, thou art God from everlaſting, and world without end.* Where it ſignifies no true and really ſubſiſting time, for this

time began only with the motions of the *heavens*, as *Aristotle* himselfe witnesseth. In briefe therefore, to shut up this Argument, and this whole Controversie; The first instant and moment of time reall, before mentioned, was both a *beginning* and *end*; a *beginning* of *time reall*, and an *end* of *time imaginary*: nor is it any absurdity to say, that *time imaginary*, was before *true and really subsisting time*.

11 And thus have we with all possible speed run over the reasons which bee usually brought to proove the worlds being from everlasting: let us now with like or lesse brevity passe over those reasons which serve to improove this errour: and they are only two, which wee will but propound, avoyding over-tedious long discourse, and so goe on to the other part of the question. First then, from our owne experience we reason thus: It is a truth confirmed

confirmed by the triall of all times, that the quantities of mens bodies have a perceivable impayring, as alſo the length and continuance of their lives: ſo that, if in that infinite ſpace of foregoing time, men had had being (as without queſtion, the world was never voyd of men, the principall and moſt noble member thereof) through continuall and inceſſant decay, their bodies had beene brought to as little a quantity as they are capable of, if not cleane conſumed: but wee ſee their quantity is not yet come unto the loweſt, therefore had they not being from everlaſting. Secondly and more ſpecially, had this world beene from everlaſting, infinite alſo had beene the propagation of man: and ſo we would bring into the world an actuall infiniteneſſe, as abſurd in Nature as Paralogiſmes be in Logicke: for in this infinite ſpace and generation there had beene

been an infinit number of mens ſoules, which being by Nature uncapable of Mortality, wee cannot ſay, that as one was created, another was deſtroyed, and ſo ſhould there bee an *infiniteneſſe* in regard of number, actually ſubſiſting in Nature. And thus hoping that ſmall power will ſerve to confound an adverſary already overcome, we paſſe to the other part of the Queſtion, purpoſing as much brevity as its difficulty and obſcurity will beare.

Chap.

Chap. VIII.

The queſtion of the worlds eternity ex Parte Poſt, *ſtated by explication of the worlds* (*corruption*) *and* (*Annihilation.*) *The world ſhall have an end by way of corruption. The creature not deſirous of corruption but its owne conſervation, as appeareth by* Scaligers Pudica *and* Ariſtotles Sponges. *The creature by deſire of perfection accidentally gaineth corruption. Nature cannot make a thing which hath being to have no being: God can annihilate*

late the world, but will not, and doeth thereby ſhew his omnipotency. The world hath not alwaies continued in the ſame ſtate.

12 THe Queſtion is touching the worlds immortality, whether, as it had a beginning of being, ſo it ſhall alſo have an end. *Ariſtotle* when he firſt heard of theyr opinion, who appointed an end unto the world, ſcoffingly burſt out into theſe words: *I was once afraid that my houſe eyther by force of tempeſt, or by iniury of time, or laſtly by ſome defect in the workeman-ſhip, ſhould have ſuddenly over-whelmed me, but now I have great cauſe to feare my owne and my houſes ruine, becauſe of thoſe that in words goe about to pull downe the world.* But for the playner

playner and more ſpeedy proceeding in the controverſie, let us in one word ſet downe the true meaning of the queſtion. There is a two-fold end, the one of *corruption*; the other of *annihilation*: the end of *corruption*, I call that whereby a thing is changed from *being* to a not *being*, not ſimply as if it ceaſed altogether to bee in nature but becauſe it looſeth that being which before it had; as for example, when wood by force of fire is turned into aſhes, we may not untruely ſay, there is a corruption of the wood, foraſmuch as it ceaſeth to bee wood, and is become aſhes; yet cannot we ſay here is any annihilation, for we ſe there is a ſubſtance remaining, but the matter which before was vnder the forme of wood, hath now put on the forme of aſhes, and ſo of wood corrupted, are aſhes generated, according to that worne Axiome of *Ariſtotle*, *That the corruption*

corruption of one thing, is the generation of another. The end of annihilation is, when a thing ſo looſeth its preſent being, that no part thereof, neyther matter nor yet forme abideth any longer in Nature; but as it firſt was made of nothing, ſo is it againe turned into nothing. The queſtion then (as I take it) muſt bee thus underſtoode, that the world ſhall have an end, though not of annihilation, yet of corruption; that is, in other termes, though it ſhall not utterly be aboliſhed and turned unto nothing, (for the matter thereof ſhall ſtill remayne) yet it ſhalbe changed into another eſtate and condition. The firſt part of the aſſertion is prooved by the authority of the Learned For *Plato* witneſſeth in his *Timæus*; ſo ſayth *Bockus*, and *Methodius*, and *Damaſcene* in his ſecond Booke *viz. Of Orthodoxal Fayth:* teſtified alſo by the wiſe *Salomon, Eccleſ.* 3. *I have learned* (ſayth the

the Preacher) *that all the workes of the Lord endure for ever.* That is, as I interpret it, though not without corruption, yet without annihilation. Now whether they have this ſtate of corruption by Nature, or no, there is a great queſtion: but wee may probably anſwer, that of themſelves and their naturall diſpoſition infuſed by God, they have no naturall inclination, or deſire of corruption, much leſſe of annihilation, foraſmuch as every thing hath a Naturall Love of its being, and an innated hatred of all things that bee enemies unto the ſame, teſtified by that naturall Sympathy and Antipathy which may be obſerved in things deſtitute of reaſon: for ſo wee ſee in experience, the *Lambe* which never had experience of the Woolves cruelty, even at the firſt ſight doth tremble and flye for feare: Nay in Creatures of a lower degree than theſe, tearmed by *Ariſtotle*,

Ariſtotle, *Plant-Animals*, wee may obſerve the like Antipathy. *Scaliger* reporteth of a Tree, growing in the Province which he calls *Pudifatamea*, that at a mans neere approaching, for modeſty, draweth in his farre-ſpreading boughes, at his departure ſpreades it ſelfe againe, for that cauſe termed by the Inhabitants, the *Shame-faced-tree*. But wee may more probably attribute this its contraction, to a naturall divining (as it were) and fore-feeling that it hath of ſome harme, whereof it is in danger, as may be proportionably gathered by the like behaviour in other things of the ſame kinde. For ſo *Ariſtotle* writeth of the *Spongies* that (when a man puts foorth his hand to diſplace them, as alſo before a tempeſt) ſhrinke up together on a heape, as if they meant to ſhift for themſelves, eyther by flight, or elſe by uniting their diſperſed forces, for the ſtronger reſiſtance;

ſtance ; which are evident proofes of that naturall ingrafted deſire in all things to preſerve their being. For whereas the firſt matter is ſayd to deſire corruption, for that as not contented with the forme it preſently enjoyeth, it deſire another, whereupon followes the expulſion of the former before inherent: the anſwer is, that in his labouring to procure another forme, then it had, it intends not corruption, but rather perfection, not diſliking the forme incumbent, ſeeing it deſireth both; but as *Eſops dogge*, ſnatched greedily at the ſhadow which hee thought had beene a ſubſtance; meant not to looſe that which hee had faſt hold off in his teeth; So the firſt matter greedily carried to the deſire of many formes, wherein indeed conſiſteth its perfection, looſeth that which before it had: foraſmuch as by a Law of Nature, *Two formes of divers, not ſubordi-*

nate, kinds, are at the ſame time unſuffe-rable together. Sō then it deſires per-fection, but in ſtead thereof acciden-tally gayneth corruption and expulſi-on of the preexiſtent *forme.* Nothing therefore ſimply deſires its owne cor-ruption, but ſo as it may tend to it fur-ther perfection, and conſummation, much leſſe its utter abolition. For as much as it is farre better to bee in the vileſt and moſt baſe degree of being, then not to be at all. Therfore the an-nihilation of the world ſhall not bee of it ſelfe, nor yet by any meanes inter-nall. Nor can it proceed from any ex-ternall naturall agent, no not that uni-verſall fore-mentioned nature is able to bring it unto nothing. For as Nature cannot make ſomething of nothing, ſo neyther is ſhee of power ſufficient to bring a thing from being, to an utter not being at all, having a limited and finite power. To which purpoſe a lear-ned

ned Frier ſayd excellently well: That *the firſt matter of all things in reſpect of its being, and not being, is ſubject only unto Gods will, permitted to the rule of Naturall agents, onely in regard of tranſmutation.* For a Naturall Agent may induce or expell a forme eyther ſubſtantiall or accidentall. But how far ſoever mans power or Nature is carried in fury, labouring by might and maine towards an utter ruinating and deſtruction of things, yet ſhall it never attain unto *Annihilation.* They may indeed by tyrannous inflicting of death, make that which is neer the matter of a man, the matter of a carcaſe; they may alſo with fire, burne the dead corpes, but though a thouſand thouſand woodes ſhould be ſpent in burning of one poor carcaſe, yet were they never able utterly to annihilate and bring it unto nothing. So that Nature is too weake to cauſe Annihilation. But yet ſay the

ſcrupulous adverſaries, God who by his infinite and ſupernaturall power was able of nothing to make the world is by the ſame his boundleſſe power, able at his pleaſure to returne it to nothing. It is true indeed and out of queſtion, that God by his abſolute undecayed power, is ſufficient as well to deſtroy the world, as hee was at the beginning to make it: by his abſolute power, I ſay, conſidered without regard of his will, but if wee reſpect his power, reſtrayned by his will, that is, regard what hee will and hath decreed to do: if by his word wee may learne his will, wee may truly anſwer, that God himſelfe cannot annihilate the world, becauſe he can do nothing that implyeth contradiction, or that any way importeth mutability, whereby of God hee ſhould bee made no God. Nor doe wee heereby take away his omnipotency, nay rather we eſtabliſh his

his power, it being a chiefe point of infirmity and weakeneſſe, to bee capable of change, and able to denie it ſelfe: but God hath decreed not to annihilate the world, therefore hee cannot now turne it unto nothing, how then (may ſome man ſay) ſhall it have an end, for if neyther of it ſelfe it incline, nor can be by any meanes naturall inforced to Annihilation, no nor God himſelfe can turn it into nothing, what end ſhall it have? The anſwer is, that as man hath his end by death, wheras, notwithſtanding his ſoule is immortal, his body is onely changed into its firſt matter, not turned into nothing: ſo the world though incapable of annihilation, as hath beene prooved, yet hath in it an end unevitable, when it ſhall bee changed from the preſent corrupt eſtate into a farre more excellent and heavenly condition of indurance and immortality. But heer ariſeth a doubt,

moved by thoſe ſcoffers, that *Peter* propheciedſhould come in the laſt dayes, which demand, *Where is the promiſe of his comming: For ſince the Father fell on ſleepe, all things have continued alike from the beginning of the Creation.* Where by the way let us obſerve, that they make the time of *Chriſts* comming and the end of the world, things of one and the ſame ſignification, ſo that as many teſtimonies of Scripture, as warrant the certaynty of *Chriſts* comming, ſerve alſo to proove the worlds end and diſſolution. To their reaſon wee may anſwer with *Peter*, that the worlds long and hitherto unchanged continuance, is no ſure proofe of impoſſibility to be deſtroyed. For God that by his bare word could of nothing make the world, can now alſo with as great facility alter the ſtate of the ſame. But their ſuppoſition is moſt untrue, for the World hath not from the beginning con-

continued in the ſame ſtate unaltered, the whole earth being in *Noahs* flood overwhelmed with waters. But to this they may anſwer, that it was no generall or univerſall deſtruction, being extended onely to the living creatures, and they alſo in part preſerved in *Noahs* Arke. It is true indeede, that this was onely a particular or partiall deſtruction, the Heavens remayning altogether untouched, the other Elements alſo incorrupted. But yet this ſheweth a change in the Worlds eſtate which they ſeemed to deny. Touching the generall deſtruction of all things, *Peter* after anſwereth; to which place we will referre them. But that wherein the difficulty of the whole controverſie conſiſteth, is the immutable eſtate of the heavenly bodyes, wherein hath beene obſerved by experience of all Ages, a conſtancy almoſt admirable: when in this ſublunary

ry region of elementiſh bodies, there hath beene as great variety, and almoſt a circular alteration. And indeede, were the Heavens capable of corruption, how could the Spheare of the Moone, ſcituated ſo neere the Fire, have continued ſo long unconſumed. Let us therefore a little examine how the caſe ſtands, with the Heavens in the matter of Corruption.

Chap.

Chap. IX.

The Heavens are not without matter, and though hitherto they have had noe change in their substance, yet are capable of future transmutation; and had not continued so long without alteration, but by the Soveraigne power of God. The matter of the Heavens desireth no new forme, but is content with that which it now enjoyeth. Averroes his definition of the Heavens, containeth a contradiction.

13 THere are two differento-pinions of them that make he heavens incorrupti-

ble

ble, ſome doe deliver them from corruption, have made them voyd of all matter, others allot them a matter but in a diſtinct kinde from that of the ſublunary bodies, all agreeing, that they be incorruptible. The chiefe of the firſt Sect, is *Averroes*, a learned Arabian, who expoſtulating the matter with us, demands by what meanes we came to know the matter of the Heavens? For the onely meanes to proove the exiſtence of matter in any thing, is, as hee calleth it, *Subſtantiall tranſmutation*; or more plainely, the *ſucceſſion of formes*. But in Heaven there hath beene no ſuch ſucceſſion, no nor any alteration of qualities, therefore the Heavens are *immateriall*. But wee may anſwer, firſt that the being of matter in any thing is known as well by accidentary, or locall, as by *ſubſtantiall tranſmutation*. But the heavens have a locall Motion, or Mutation, at leaſt in their parts, therefore

therfore they consist of matter. Secondly, we answer thus, that although the heavens have all this while lasted without change in their substance, yet seeing they are capable of future transmutation, wee may thence conclude the presence of matter in them. For who would say, that there is in a sucking child no reasonable soule because hee seeth in him no actuall use of reason, or present conceit of Learning, wee know that his potentiall disposition and fitnesse to conceive, is testimony sufficient of that soule which is in him. Their second argument is this, all things consisting of a corporall matter, are withall corruptable, for the ability of receiving the yet absent formes being a property inseparable from the matter, which also is accompanied with a longing desire to supply its defects, there must needs be granted an expulsion of the incumbent forme for induction of a new

new ſucceſſor, wherein is corruption; or els this, The matters inclination and ingrafted deſire, as it were, muſt bee alway fruſtrate, which folly, the moſt wiſe God of Nature deteſteth; therefore there is in the heavens no ſuch matter as we talke of. To which argument, they that make the matter of the celeſtiall bodies different from that of the Sublunary creatures, frame this anſwer: Indeed (ſay they) what ſo ever is compounded of ſuch a matter as this is, of the Sublunary creature, is ſubject unto corruption; but the heavens have a matter of a different and farre more excellent ſtate than theſe under Elements, and that is the ſumme and foundation of *Ariſtotle* his opinion and reaſon touching the Heavens incorruptible condition. But we that make one matter of both, may thus ſomewhat probably anſwer: That though ſuch a matter is alway accompanyed with

with a capableneſſe of corruption, yet may it by ſome ſuperior overruling power, be preſerved from all actuall corruption. And ſo ſtandeth the caſe with the heavens, which never had been able of themſelves ſo long to have continued without alteration, but by helpe of ſome higher power, not as the Peripateticks and Platonicks fondly imagine the Angels or Inteligences (which *Alcinous* calleth leſſer Gods) but by the ſoveragne appointment of God, who to moderate and ſtay the too frequent and overhaſty alteration of the underbodyes, hath allotted the heavens this regularity and uniformity of motion.

But heere they will demand a reaſon, what hath ſo fulfilled the matters deſire of interchangeable ſucceſſion of formes, that it remayneth contented with that forme which it preſently enjoyeth. The Anſwer is, That eyther

eyther the excellency of the forme preſent, cauſeth this contentment, or elſe Gods appoyntment overſwayeth its deſire. How then? Are we Patrons or rather Authors of violence in thoſe excellent agreeing bodies? Nay rather, by the limitation of the matters unſtayed indifferency, wee doe more eſtabliſh that their excellent harmony. For as in a City ſcituate on the confines of two diſagreeing Kingdomes, of it ſelfe inclining to neyther ſide, but indifferent for entertainment of either conquering Adverſary, if after valorous conqueſt performed by one party, it yeeldeth it ſelfe to the vanquiſhers Dominion, and by the provident induſtrious care of the new ſupervisor, be fortified againſt the violent irruption of the fore-vanquiſhed adverſaries; by this new reſtraint of its old indifferency ſuffereth no violence, but rather is confirmed in a quiet and peaceable condition

condition within it ſelfe : So the matter of the celeſtiall bodies, howſoever naturally indifferent to entertayne any forme, if by the conquering action of ſome prevayling Agent it be poſſeſſed of ſo excellent and powerfull a forme as admits of no outward new impreſſion in this limitation, of its equall, and ſtable diſpoſition, is not any way violenced ; but rather fitter for the intended harmony of the celeſtiall bodies. And that may ſerve for a ſufficient reaſon of the hitherto incorrupted condition of the celeſtiall bodies. Now touching their future eſtate, wee ſhall after diſpute, if firſt wee have their fourth argument for diſproofe of the matter, as alſo the ſubſtance of their opinion. *Averroes* therfore ſayth, that Heaven is a forme of a ſelf ſubſiſtence; immateriall, dimenſionall, locally mooveable, participating light and other accidents ; wherein, me thinketh,

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is a playne contradiction : for to omit the disquisition, whether any forme can consist without matter, what is more absurd then to imagine quantity really seperate from the matter, quantity having its basis and foundation in the matter, and onely limitation from the forme? farther, whatsoever is capable of reall division, hath this capability (that I may so terme it) from the matter : *Reall division*, I say, for the Mathematicians proportionably to their mentall abstraction or separation of quantity, have also a mentall division, but whatsoever hath quantity, is capable of such a division, therefore also it hath a matter. Over and beside all this, whatsoever is perceivable by sense, hath a matter; for the forme of nothing can be perceived by sense, but is understood and conceyved by its operation in the matter : but the heaven is sensible, therefore also materiall. To this

this adde *Averroes* his owne teſtimony ſet downe in his Comment upon *Ariſtotle* his ſeventh booke of Metaphyſickes, wherein himſelfe confeſſeth, that accidents are inſeparable companions of the firſt Matter; but the heaven (by his owne authority in the firſt alleadged place) hath in it light and other accidents inherent, how is it then altogether voyd of matter? Other Arguments taken from the inherency of qualities peculiarly incident unto things materiall, for brevities ſake, I omit, haſtening to the ſecond Patrons of the Heavens immortality, that doe acknowledge a compoſition of a matter and a form in the celeſtiall bodies, but will have it a different and diſtinct kinde from the elementiſh matter of the under bodies.

Chap. X.

The matter of the Ethereall and Elementiſh bodies is of the ſame kind, otherwiſe we cannot come to the firſt matter, and nature abhorreth plurality where there is no neceſſitie. The unſeperabilitie of their forme from the matter, proves rather a diſtinction of their forme from that of the Sublunarie bodyes, then of the matters. The forme of the Heavens is of ſo unconquerable a Nature, that no naturall agent can cauſe a new impreſſion. Platoes divine ſentence.

Touching,

14 TOuching the ſenſe of the queſtion, *Plato* and ſome of his followers in this errour, interpret it, as if when we ſay, the heavens conſiſt of elementary matter, wee meant, that they are ſo compounded of the Elements, as are mixt bodies heere below: whereupon ſome of the more ancient Sectaries in this kind, as *Heraclitus* and *Pythagoras*, thought that it was made of *fire*: *Thales* and *Anaximenes*, of *Earth*: *Empedocles*, of a medley of *ayre* and *fire*: *Plato* himſelfe, of the *foure Elements*, or, as *Proclus* recordeth his opinion, of the *quinteſſence* of them: whoſe refutation wee omit, as impertinent unto our purpoſe: for our meaning is not that the Elements are the matter whereof the heavens bee made, but thus we underſtand it, that the matter of the Ethereall and Elementiſh bodies is of the ſame *kind*; the

whole first matter being divided into these principall parts, as into halfes, the one halfe united unto the formes celestiall, the other halfe coupled unto the formes of the Elements: and so, as I conceive, is that place in the beginning of *Genesis* to be understood, where it is sayd, that *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth*, that is, the matter whereof *heaven* and the *elements* were afterwards made, signified unto us by the name of those *waters whereupon the spirit of God was mooved*: and me thinketh the argument is very sound; which is commonly alleadged by our partakers: for as in other kinds of causes there is one, first and principall wherunto all the rest are reduced, so also in this kind of the Matter, there being the like reason of all. But if we distinguish the Matter of the heavens, from that of the Elements, wee cannot come to one first Matter of all things; therefore

therfore there is the ſame Matter both of the celeſtiall and inferiour bodies, to which we may adde that thred-bare argument of the Philoſophers, *Without neceſſity we muſt not imagine a plurality in Nature*, foraſmuch as Nature abhorreth Vanity ; but there is no neceſſity of the matters plurality ; for the maine ground of this diſtinction (for ought that I can ſee) is, leſt they ſhould bee forced to grant a power in the heavens tending to corruption, which, as is before ſayd, hath no neceſſary illation, foraſmuch as the excellency of the forme preſent, reſtrayneth the wandring indifferent deſire of the matter, reſiſting the violent impreſſion of forraine qualities that ſhould breede Rebellion of the ſubject creatures, againſt their commander the heavens. But touching their reaſons, in my poore opinion, they are very inſufficient : for firſt thus they diſpute : The formes of

the ſublunary bodies may bee ſeparated from their matter, but the heavens forme is unſeparable; when in my judgement, they proove rather a diſtinction of formes, then any diverſity of the matter. Or if they thence prove a diverſity of matter, becauſe the forms incident, are of greater and leſſe excellency, one in reſpect of another, wee may as well ſay, that the body of a man is of diſtinct matter from that of the other more baſe creatures, becauſe his forme is ſo p.ſſing excellent. Or if they reſtrayne their compariſon only to the power of ſeparation, that becauſe the matter of the heavens is joyned inſeparably to the forme, when contrariwiſe, the elementiſh matter hath often ſeparation, therefore there is not the ſame matter of both: we anſwer, that the ſame matter in *kinde*, may ſo inſeparably bee united to its forme, as that it can never be ſejoined; not

not that we deny a power of future ſeparation of the heavens matter from the preſent forme, but that this may bee a ſufficient reaſon of their hitherto inſeparable union. A ſecond Argument is that of *Ariſtotle*, ſaith he, whatſoever things participate the ſame matter, are capable of mutable tranſmutation, but the heavens can never bee changed into the inferiour bodies, for ſomuch as the Elements are altogether paſſively diſpoſed for receit of the heavens action, without any reaction upon the heavens, therefore there is not the ſame matter of both. To which we anſwer, that the propoſition or firſt ſentence muſt bee underſtood of a potentiall tranſmutation, and that with this exception; unleſſe the matters imperfection bee perfected by the formes inherent excellency, or reſiſtance be made of ſome ſuperior form, to turne away the violence of the op

pugning Agent. Wee ſay, that the forme now being in the heavens, is of ſo powerfull and unconquerable a nature, as that no naturall contrary agent is able to compaſſe any the leaſt new Impreſſion. Thirdly, thus they reaſon: Were the heavens of the ſame matter with the bodies of the elements then in like ſort ſhould they, at leaſt by Nature, be corruptible; but the corruption is altogether abhorrent from the heavens nature. To which aſſumption *Dam ſcene* anſweres by a flat deniall; for even the heavens in his Philoſophie are naturally ſubject to corruption. To which accordeth that of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, that attributes the heavens incorruptibleneſſe to a ſuperiour more powerfull cauſe. For ſo hee brings in the maker of the world ſpeaking unto the celeſtiall bodies: *By nature you are diſſoluble, but through my will preſerved from diſſolution. Nor ſhall the*

deſtinies

deſtinies of death prevaile over you, to deſtroy you, becauſe my will is a bond of more power to keepe you from corruption, then that wherewith at your firſt making you were holden together. And thus have we haſtily runne over the difficult queſtion of the heavens matter. Touching the certainty and meanes of their diſſolution, we will briefly ſpeak by and by, after the reſolution of the other arguments, for the non-diſſolution of the World.

Chap. XI.

Simon Magus *his* Sophiſtrie, *concerning the worlds eternitie, refelled out of the* Recog. Beati Petri. *The time of the worlds diſſolution not to be diſputed of, becauſe*

because unrevealed. The manner of it glanced at by the Stoicks: declared by Saint Peter *and the Psalmist. The motion of the Heavens shall cease, when by their corruption they shall be made more glorious, the three finall causes of their motion being then Superseaded. A transition from the discourse of the Generall state of the world, to the private state of man.*

15 SImon *Magus*, as it is recorded, *lib.* 3. *Recog Beat Petri, Cap.* 3. (if the records be true) thus replyed upon the learned Apostle, for the worlds immortality: If God be infinitely and onely good, and the world also good, how shall God in the end destroy the world? If he destroy

ſtroy that which is good, how ſhall himſelfe continue good? If hee pull it downe becauſe it is evill, how ſhall he then be free from evill, that made it evill? To which we anſwer with St. *Peter* in the ſame place: That the world in its firſt originall ſtate was good, yet ſo as it was fore-ordained to diſolution: nor doe we thereby detract from Gods goodneſſe; for the heavens (the moſt excellent part of the world) being not made for themſelues, but for ſome end after to be revealed; how good ſoever, yet were to be diſſolved, that that for which they were ordained might appeare: which alſo *Peter* thus familiarly ſheweth; who ſeeth not how cunningly an Egſhell is framed, yet for manifeſtation of the end of its making, it muſt bee broken of neceſſity. So muſt the preſent eſtate of the world, of neceſſity be deſtroyed, that the more excellent condition of the Kingdome of Heaven

Heaven may bee made manifeſt : at which time alſo this degenerated evill ſtate of corruption ſhall be done away, that a more glorious eſtate of incorruption may be reſtored. So then, that the world ſhall have an end, I take it, it is manifeſt; and that, not an end of annihilation, but of corruption : which indeed ſhall be a way unto its perfection. Now concerning the times and ſeaſons of the worlds diſſolution, we will not take upon us curiouſly to determine, ſeeing God, the beginning and end of all things, hath left the time unrevealed unto us. Touching the meanes and manner of the diſſolution, the *Stoicks* glanced at it a farre off, being of opinion, that the world ſhould by fire bee diſſolved. For thinking the ſtarres and the skyes fire, to have a waſting action upon the inferiour Elements, theyr nouriſhing moyſture by little and little decaying, when neyther the earth can have

have refection by the water, nor the ayre procreation after its absolute consumption, there shall remaine nothing but fire to consume both the Heavens and the earth, of which afterward a new world should be made; whose opinion is very consonant unto that of *Peter*, save onely that they thought this destruction should come of a naturall necessity; for *Peter* also taught, it should be by fire, wherewith *God* (withdrawing his hand of preservation) should consume this world, and of the ashes hereof create a new; yet so, as neyther the seate of the blessed soules in heaven, nor the dungeon of the damned in hell should be destroyed; that neyther the ioyes of the Saints, nor the torments of the wicked, should be interrupted. As for the firmament and the other inferiour spheres, together with the elements, they shall be indued with another, and that a farre more excellent

cellent condition, putting off theſe accidents and affections of corruption fit for the continuall generation and corruption of the naturall bodyes, and receiuing other qualities, agreeable to the incorruptible eſtate of the world to come; ſo that their ſubſtance ſhall be all one, howſoever they alter their qualities. As in the reſurrection mens bodyes ſhall be of the ſame ſubſtance, but of a different diſpoſition, *For this corruption muſt put on incorruption, and this mortall muſt put on immortality.* So that as Saint *Paul* ſayd, *our imperfect knowledge which we have in this life, ſhall in the after world be aboliſhed, becauſe then we ſhall have a more full and perfect knowledge of God and his Chriſt.* So may we well ſay, this world ſhall bee deſtroyed, becauſe it ſhall loſe this preſent eſtate of imperfection and put on a more glorious condition fit for the world to come. And ſo, I take it, are

thoſe

thoſe places of the Scripture to be underſtood, where mention is made of the worlds periſhing, that is, the preſent eſtate of this world ſhall bee aboliſhed, and the ſame ſubſtance indued with a more glorious condition. To which accordeth that of *David*, *Pſal.* 102. *They ſhall periſh but thou ſhalt indure, they ſhall all wax old as doth a garment, as a veſture ſhalt thou change them and they ſhall be changed:* plainely ſignifying, that the periſhing of the creatures ſhall bee onely an alteration, which God ſhall bring upon them.

16 Now to that fruitleſſe queſtion of the heavens motion or reſt, wee may anſwer probably, that they ſhall have an end of mooving, for their motion being ordayned onely for ordering things below, eſpecially for continuance of their generation, ſeeing all propagation of the ſpecies in living Creatures, as alſo mutuall procreation in

in the elementiſh liveleſſe bodies being ended, to what purpoſe ſhould the heavens mooving longer indure? Which may alſo ſemblably be anſwered touching the action and paſſion of the Elements, as alſo for the being of things compounded of their mixture, as plants and ſenſible creatures, being things ordayned onely for mans helpe, and ſuſtenance, who in that bleſſed ſtate of immortality, without the leaſt defect, ſhall need no ſuch ſupply of his wants; which quiet and reſtfull eſtate of theſe under-bodies, is not, as ſome have fondly imagined, to be attributed only unto the quiet reſt of the heavens; for when at the prayers of *Ioſhuah* the Sun ſtood ſtill, and with it the reſt of the celeſtiall bodies, (unleſſe wee imagine the whole courſe of them to have been perverted) yet ceaſed not the naturall actions of things belowe, for even at that time did *Ioſhuah* fight. But the true

true cauſe of their reſt from motion is, the will of the firſt cauſe, without whoſe adjuvant-fellow-working, the ſecondary cauſes are quite diſabled to performe their functions. From hence therefore, namely from the certainty of the worlds diſſolution, we thus reaſon for our maine poſition. For if the world uncapable of eternity, have a limited time of indurance, which it cannot paſſe, then hath man alſo his continuance bounded, at leaſt within compaſſe of the worlds laſting. For location being a thing inſeparable from exiſtence, the world, mans habitation, and manſion houſe being diſſolved, man, the principall inhabitant, muſt have a joynt and fellow diſſolution. But for the more through-handling of this undoubted truth, our purpoſe is more particularly to treate thereof; therefore to leave this farre fetched, though not impertinent reaſon, taken

from the worlds inevitable deſtruction, we will come to a neerer and more proper diſquiſition, holding our ſelves within the compaſſe of mans owne nature.

Chap. XII.

Paracelſus *his vaine confidence in the power of his owne Art, confuted by his owne death, before hee attained to* 30. *Man in the ſtate of corruption Subject to death, not in the puritie of his creation. Death uſhered in by Sinne.*

17 I Have read of a late living learned Phyſitian, *Paracelſus* by name, who had ſuch confidence in the abſolute perfection of his skill, that he doubted not to profeſſe himſelfe able by Phyſicke to preſerve a man in ſo perfect a temperature, that he ſhould never die by ſickneſſe; but his owne haſtie leaving of his life, was confutation ſufficient, of his either falſe oſtentation, or extreame madneſſe. For himſelfe eyther not able, which bewrayed his unskilfull impotency, or elſe unwilling; which ſhewed his willfull folly, ere he came to the prime of his age, before he was thirty yeares old, ended his dayes, learning at length by his owne experience, that Art can never overcome the neceſſity of Nature; nor mans cunning prevent or prevert the decrees of the deſtinies. But to the matter in hand, the queſtion

is, whether man by nature is ſubject unto death, the end of Nature? To which we anſwer, that mans nature hath a double conſideration; firſt in the incorrupt ſtate and purity of Creation; ſecondly in the degenerated condition of corruption which although it were altogether unknowne unto the Gentiliſh Philoſophers, yet is its conſideration in part Philoſophicall, and therefore not wholly to be omitted. Now in the firſt conſideration of nature, wee anſwer negatively, foraſmuch as undefiled nature was uncapable of the Soules ſeparation from the body, betweene which there was ſo abſolute and perfect an harmony and conſent, that as the under faculties of the Soule, were in ſubjection to the reaſonable and moſt principall part thereof, without the leaſt jarre and diſagreement; ſo fared it in the body, though compounded of the contrary natures of the foure

foure elements, yet ſo weil tempered by proportion, that there could bee no obſervance of the leaſt diſcord. But after that mans pride, ſet abroch by the Divels ſuggeſtion, ventred to taſte of the forbidden fruit for deſire of knowledge; the light of reaſon being the life of the Soule, overcaſt by the unavoydable Cloudes of ignorance, there grew a diſagreement and quarrel among the ſubject inferior parts of the Soule, from whence followeth the warre of the Elements in the body, never to be ended till the field were loſt by bloud: and therefore excellent was the ſpeech of the Fryer *Ferus*; *The diſeaſes of the body came from ſinne the Soules ſickneſſe, the death of the body from the death of the ſoule; who dares ſay, the dealing is unequall, that he ſhould incurre the death of the body, who wilfully rejected the life of the ſoule? Or who marvailes that the Divell by gods ſufferance tormen-*

teth the body with diſeaſes, that gave the divell a place of dwelling in his ſoule? So that the death of the body being the ſeperation of the Soule from the body, was a punniſhment inflicted for mans wilfull ſequeſtration of himſelfe from God; and it is a good collection more then conjecturall, that the body had never beene ſubject to the corruption of deſtruction, had not the Soule beene tainted with the corruption of defiling. Man therefore in his primary ſtate of Creation, was not naturally ſubject unto death, but in the defiled condition of corrupted Nature, death is become inevitable; and therefore *Thales Mileſius*, one of the ſeven Wiſe men, was wont to ſay, that there was no difference betweene a mans life and his death, being both things agreeable unto nature: and thence proceeded their reſolute contempt of death, becauſe they thought it was inevitable: whereupon the

the *Epicure* himſelfe conſidering the inevitableneſſe of deaths comming, was (as *Maximus* witneſſeth) wont to ſay; *That againſt other things wee muſt finde ſome defence and remedie, onely death was unreſiſtable: our body (the vndefenced City of our ſoule) being all unſufficient to withſtand the violent aſſaults of death.* But to leave the infinite teſtimonies of the learned, grounded upon ſo long experience, let us deale with reaſons more artificiall, let us deale with truth firſt in particular, that every man hath his endurance dated, which he cannot paſſe; afterward goe unto the ſpecies, to declare it alſo in the whole kinde.

Chap.

Chap. XIII.

The reason of mans mortalitie taken from his Composition. The first naturall cause of naturall death is contrariety in the compound. Averroes his definition of sickneſſe. The Philoſophers saying that Mans life consisteth in heate, how to be understood. As much neceſsitie of moysture as heate. The assaulting action of heate, upon the Radicall humidity, and the impuritie of the externall nouriſhment, taining the internall principall causes of corruption.

The

THe principall and mayne reaſon is taken from his compoſition; for man conſiſting of a matter and a forme, as doe alſo the other bodily living Creatures, though the ſpirituall ſubſtance of his ſoule bee immortall, yet his body being made of the firſt matter, whoſe inſeparable companion is a deſire of change, there muſt of neceſſity follow diſſolution; for God and nature (according to our preſuppoſition) doing nothing in vain, this inſatiable appetite of receyving new formes, ſhall not finally remayne wholly fruſtrate: if therefore we grant an induction of a new forme, wee muſt withall grant an expulſion of that that before was inherent, foraſmuch as two formes of divers kindes are unſufferable together in the ſame ſubject, whereupon doth follow the corruption of the whole compound. But if we

ſhall

ſhall make a more diligent and narrow inquiry into the cauſes of this diſſolution, wee may finde plenty of reaſons miniſtred to confirme this truth. Now the firſt cauſe Naturall of naturall death, is contrariety in the compound, for all corruption preſuppoſing alteration, which is onely betwixt, and by meanes of contrary qualities, contrariety of the inherent qualitiés, (being the onely cauſe of alteration) is alſo cauſe of the compounds corruption, which is farther manifeſted by experience, for ſo wee ſee things wherein is leaſt diſagreement, to bee of longeſt continuance, and the immateriall ſubſtance of the creatures ſpirituall, voyd of all contrariety, uncapable alſo of corruption, ſo that the inherence of contrariety is one ſpeciall cauſe of the compounds diſſolution. Man therefore whoſe body conſiſts of the ever-jarring elements, *Fire, Ayre, Water, Earth*, hath

hath alſo an unreſiſtable home-bred cauſe of diſſolution. Furthermore, the conſent of all Philoſophers, and reaſon it ſelfe hath ſet downe this truth as undeniable, that mans life and the chiefe mayntenance thereof, conſiſteth principally, if not wholly, in the due and juſt proportionable temperature of the fowre firſt qualities, *Heate, Colde, Drineſſe, Moyſture*, and till their diſproportion, there is no danger of death, or any growing ſickeneſſe: whereupon *Averroes* hath this definition of ſickeneſſe; That *it is* nothing elſe, but *the unnaturall diſproportion of thoſe fowre qualities, whereby the part whereinto the ſame is incident, is diſabled to performe its naturall functions*, whereout ariſeth this collection as neceſſary, being almoſt all one with thoſe things foreſayd, *viz.* that the diſproportion of the fowre firſt qualities, and their ſwarving from their juſt temperature, is cauſe of their

their ſubjects diſſolution: but in every man wee ſee a declining from his engrafted naturall complexion, which alſo increaſeth more and more according as his ages are altered, therefore mans diſſolution cannot bee avoyded: where (by the way) wee muſt not let paſſe the ſaying of the Philoſopher; that *mans life conſiſteth in heat*, which alſo is thereby prooved, becauſe in the preſence thereof, if it be not exceſſive, we ſee a kinde of clarity and vigor, as it were, newly infuſed, at its departure the wonted or rather far greater recourſe of languor. But we are not ſo to underſtand that ſaying of the Philoſopher, as if heat were the ſole and only cauſe of life; for even by *Ariſtotle* his owne witneſſe, the temper of the fowre firſt qualities, is the trueſt and moſt proper continent cauſe of life: but the meaning is, that our naturall heate is the chiefe inſtrument of the

ſoule to exercile the vitall functions, as *nutrition, augmentation,* and ſuch like, yet ſo tempered, that it exceed not the proportionable meaſure of our natural moyſture, the foode and nouriſhment of our heat. And hence is that of *Ficinus,* that *our life, as light, conſiſteth in heat, whoſe food and mayntenance is of an Aery and fatty moyſture, not unlike unto oyle, whoſe immoderate exceſſe and impurity or defect, are all waſters of our vitall heat*; ſo that there was as great neceſſity of moyſture, as of heat, in the performance of our naturall vitall functions, whence came the neceſſity of nouriſhment: for our congenerate heate having a conſuming action upon our moyſture, the reſiſtance thereof being altogether unable to withſtand the heats aſſaulting action, Nature that like a kinde mother is never wanting to the neceſſities of her off-ſpring, hath beſtowed on our ſoule a faculty, wherby

to

to reſtore our decayed moyſture, through the aſſimilation of the nouriſhment applied unto the waſted ſubſtance. Now the eſpeciall meanes of this decay, as is aforelayd, is our heats aſſaulting action, whereby the Soule continually engendreth of our humidity, new ſpirits, for mayntaynance of the vitall and ſenſuall actions, which being waſted by their never-ceaſing operation (as nothing is able long to continue without interchangeable reſt) have of neceſſity a ſupply from our humidity, and our moyſture alſo equally decayed, hath the like ſupply made by nouriſhment which wee receyve, leſt there ſhould follow a ſudden deſtruction: hence therefore, that is from the neceſſity of continuall nouriſhment, we inferre a decay of naturall moyſture, for otherwiſe whereunto is nutrition directed?

19 But heere remayneth a doubt; for

for if there bee reſtitution of the loſt naturall moiſture, made by the receipt of nouriſhment, whence commeth death the end of Nature? For our heat having alway what to feed upon, eyther by Nature, or by this outward ſupply of nouriſhment, and death never aſſayling us, but by the baniſhment and extinguiſhing of this naturall heat, where is this neceſſity of ending our life? The anſwer is, that the impurity of the outward nouriſhment inwardly applied, by degrees taynteth that naturall ingendred humidity, and by its continuall mixture, at length wholly corrupteth it. For as in the mingling of water with wine, the greater the infuſion of water is, the more is the infeebling and weakning of the wines force, till at length it be cleane oppreſſed and extinguiſhed: ſo is it in the caſe of nutrition, wherein though at firſt our naturall heat and moyſture retayne

their

their purity and naturall quality, yet at length by contiuuall mixture of the alimentary humour, there followeth a totall and perfect corruption of their integrity. Now if by the reſtorative faculty of the Soule there could bee ſupply made of as pure moyſture as that which was loſt, the creature might (for any thing in nature) be preſerved alive for ever. And therefore *Ficinus* beſide the juſt proportion of moyſture unto the heat, requireth alſo purity and incorruption in the moyſture; for as every moyſture is not a preſerver of the light of a Lampe, but though oyle maintaynes the flame, yet water doth quench it; ſo is it in the caſe of our life, which principally conſiſteth in heat, for the watriſh humidity doeth cleane extinguiſh it. And thence it is, that old men when they are neereſt unto their end, abound with a watriſh humour, yet are they ſayd to be

be cold and drie, as wanting indeede that moysture which is the fitteſt for their heat to feed upon.

Chap. XIV.

Death is Naturall or Violent. Naturall death cauſed by the fayling of naturall heat, contrary to the opinion of Scaliger. *Vnnaturall or violent death, how cauſed. The tearme of Nature, and tearme of Gods preſcience.*

20 SO that the truth of the poſition is manifeſt in the particulars, namely that every man hath an end and tearme of indurance which he cannot paſſe. Now this end

commeth eyther by meanes naturall and growing in him, or by violent and unnaturall meanes. Whereupon they have diſtinguiſhed Death into two kindes, one *Naturall*, the other *Violent*. Naturall death is where our native moyſture is by meanes of our naturall heat (continually working upon it) conſumed and diſpatched, whence followeth a lingring, languiſhing and pining of our naturall heat as wanting what to feed upon; contrary to the ſubtill opinion of the fault-finding *Iulius Scaliger*, that thought our naturall heat to bee weakened, and in the end cleane conſumed, onely by want of interchangeable reſt, and ceaſing from its operation. For as wee ſee fire not waſted by much uſe, but lingringly extinguiſhed by decay and want of fit fewell for to feed upon; ſo our home bred naturall heat not tyred with over working, but languiſhing with the decay

cay of fit food, is at length, together with our moyſture its naturall provided food, cleane conſumed. To which may be added that ſaying of *Fernelius*, to this purpoſe, that though *Aeſculapius* himſelfe, the God of *Phyſicke* had the guiding of the moſt temperate complexioned man that can be imagined, and that from his birth, to keepe him from all outward annoyances whatſoever, yet hath he in himſelfe an home-bred enemy by little and little to ſpoyle him of his life. Unnaturall and violent death, is when our naturall heat, eyther with too much colde, or exceſſive externall heat, or with an immoderate meaſure of moyſture is extinguiſhed. According to which two kindes of death, the learned Schoolemen have deviſed a double tearme of our life: There is, ſay they, *A tearme of Nature*, and there is, *A tearme beſide Nature*. *The naturall tearme*, is that ut-

moſt time, that a man by his complexion can reach unto, which is futher off or neerer according the differences of mens temperatures. The *tearme* or limit *beſide nature*, is when mans life eyther commeth ſhort of that length which by his complexion hee may attayne unto, or is protracted and prolonged beyond the courſe of nature, and that they call the end or tearme of *Gods preſcience*, and fore-appointment in his unrevealed will, which a man can neyther prevent, nor yet prolong: and this hath for the moſt part place in violent death; and was therefore alſo propounded by thoſe devoute Schoole-men, leſt men ſhould not thinke they depended onely upon chance, or fell out without Gods eſpeciall counſell and diſpoſing. For ſo we ſee in dayly experience, many men in the prime of their yeeres, & ſtrength of their age, eyther by riot, or famine, peſtilence,

peſtilence, or ſword, ſuddenly cut off, and wee are many times mooved with pity in that behalfe, bewayling their eſtate, that in our judgements might have lived a great deale longer: as indeed they might, if wee reſpect what they were capable of by their complexion; but in regard of Gods decree and purpoſe it was impoſſible for them to paſſe that moment and poynt of time: for Gods preſcience can never be deceyved. And this, to avoyd tedioulneſſe, may briefly ſerve for the certaynty of the end of particular men.

Chap. XV.

A tranſition from man in the individuum to the queſtion whether man in Specie is eternall. The cor-

ruption of the particular, inferreth a corruption in Specie, prooved by a demonſtration. The deſtruction of the Species may proceed from a naturall neceſſitie.

21 NOw for the indurance of man in *ſpecie* (in which regard onely he is ſayde to be a part of the world) we may paſſe over unto it by way of *Prolepſis*, or preoccupation. For it may be objected, that though there is a limited endurance of particular and ſingle men, yet there may be a perpetuall preſervation of the *ſpecies* or kinde: and therefore God hath beſtowed on man a faculty of procreation to propagate his kinde; that though every man muſt (of a naturall neceſſity) die, yet might he leave another of his owne kind behind him, that ſo there might be a continuall and everlaſting

everlaſting ſucceſſion. To which wee anſwer, that if they grant a corruption in the particular, they muſt withall grant it in the *ſpecies*. For the *ſpecies* being a thing exiſtent onely in imagination, not having any reall being, but as we conceive of it in the particulars, it is a neceſſary illation, that from the corruption of all the particulars, wee may conclude the like of the generall. But to ſhew it more plainly, by a demonſtrative proceeding, wee may obſerve the like courſe of decay in the *ſpecies*, as there is in the *individuum*. For as nutrition is to the particular, ſo is generation to the *ſpecies*, in the caſe of their continuance and preſervation: wherefore as by the nouriſhment wee take for reſtitution of our naturall moiſture, there being ſupplied not ſo pure humidity as was loſt, the particulars decaying by little and little, are at laſt cleane conſumed: ſo by procreation,

the mayntenance of our *ſpecies*, the purity of our complexion being by degrees and by time diminiſhed, at length there followes, even of neceſſity, an abſolute corruption. Now (as I conceive of it) the decay commeth thus, for the particulars, whoſe function this generation is, being by continuall mixture of outward nouriſhment corrupted, the ſeede, the matter and meanes of propagation cannot but bee taynted with like corruption. And that is the chiefe reaſon amongſt other leſſe principall, that men in this age of the world are of leſſe continuance then they were in former time. From all which, we thus conclude; If the naturall vigour of the *ſpecies* bee by little and little continually weakened, there muſt of neceſſity, in the end, follow a full and perfect corruption. For (as *Ariſtotle* ſayde of the diviſion of any thing finite, that by often detraction, though

though but of a little quantity, the whole becommeth at length uncapable of diviſion) ſo by continuall waſting of the vertue of the kinde, there followeth at length, even of neceſſity, a totall and inevitable extinguiſhing.

22 Now to that frivolous fruitleſſe queſtion, whether this end and deſtruction bee of nature, or proceedeth from any effectuall operation of God; wee may thus anſwer: that we diſpute not what ſhall be in this caſe, but what may be: and according to that ſenſe we ſay, that even of a naturall neceſſitie (though God ſhould not untimely cut off the thred of our life) yet even of its owne accord, ſhould whole mankind have an end; which is manifeſt by that forenamed continually curtalling of our life, obſerved by experience, and noted out of the legends of antiquities: for before that univerſall deluge

luge in *Noahs* time, wee reade of ſome that lived, ſix, ſeven, eight, nine hundred yeares; as *Adam*, *Noah*, *Methuſalem*, and others. After the floud, he that lived longeſt, recorded in holy Hiſtory, exceeded not the age of a hundred and twenty yeares; ſome few yeeres after in *Davids* time, it fell to ſeventy yeares, or if there were any over-plus, it was mingled with labour and ſorrow, more worthy the name of death then life. So that we may hence conclude, that it is impoſſible for mankinde to laſt for ever, having inwardly in his nature ſufficient and unpreuentable cauſes of diſſolution.

Chap. XVI.

Some unreaſonabe Creatures longer lived then men. Men in the firſt age

age of the world, lived farre longer then now. First, because their foode was more wholesome, and the elements in which they lived, not so corrupt as now. Secondly, through Gods goodnesse, who granted them a long life, for discovery of some hidden misteries, especially in Astrologie; and for propagation of children to store the world. A Catalogue of some, which have bin reported to have lived long, within few ages past. The Authors opinion, that the relators might erre in their computation, because of the diversitie of yeares. An Arcadian yeare being but three moneths, and

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an Egyptian but one. Plinie *confeſſeth Gods goodneſſe in abreviating the life of man.*

HAving thus evidēced the truth of our two poſitions, that there is a ſet time of indurance unto every man and unto all mankind, and learning by experience, the naturall and true mother of knowledge, that among the particulars ſome have a long, ſome a ſhorter time of cotinuance and that even by nature; it remaineth that with all poſſible brevity and perſpicuity, we ſet downe the cauſes naturall of this naturall difference, which we can no otherwiſe doe, than by propounding the received cauſes of the length and ſhortnes of mans life, and according as they are more or leſſe in any man, ſo judge of their effects, *Ariſtotle* (in

(in his preface to this treatiſe) premiſeth a word or two touching the divers conſiderations of this difference according to the diverſity of that ſubject unto which they are incident. For in theſe tearmes, of *length*, and *ſhortneſſe* of life, we may compare eyther things of the ſame kinde, as man with man, or things of divers kinds, as reaſonable Creatures with liveleſſe and ſenſible things; for there are ſome unreaſonable Creatures longer lived then man, for ſo *Heſiodus* reporteth of the Crow, that he liveth out nine mens lives (meaſuring every age to be 100. yeeres) the Hart, by the ſame authors witneſſe, thriſe as many: the Raven trebleth the Harts endurance: and thence was that plaint of dying *Theophraſtus*, and complaint of natures inequality and as it were blindfoulded diſpoſition of her benefits, eſpecially in this kinde, that to *Harts* and *Crowes* ſo thankleſly had given

given so long time of continuance, which was denied unto man, that could and would have better imployed that benefit. Which complaint was personally renewed and agravated by *Beroaldus*, an old *Grammarian*, for he sticks not in the person of some captious Atheist to expostulate the matter with God, why our life (in these times) is so curtalled, that for the many hunddreds of yeares which in the first age of the world men lived, we have our stint and limits within the compasse of little more then halfe an hundred? But *Iosephus* in his first booke of *Antiquities*, giveth these reasons, and first of all the wholesome goodnesse of their nourishment, and the outward compassing elements which they inhabited. For their corrupted Nature was not greedily carried with desire of their corruptions increase as headlongly and on the sudden to engulfe it selfe into all

all extremity, but by degrees and lingringly, as upon constraint by little and little descendeth from that top and perfection of corruption. And as every thing was neereſt unto that beginning, ſo was it cleereſt and leſſe tainted with corruption. We therefore in the age and extremity of the world, are in a more extreame degree of corruption, by reaſon of that frequent alteration in the Elements, when every mutation addeth ſomewhat to the begunne impurity.

A ſecond reaſon was Gods will and bountifulneſſe, the benefit whereof was not bounded in that ſmall compaſſe and limit of time, but extended alſo unto us and to our poſterity. For God therefore granted them a longer continuance, for revealing of many hidden myſteries, eſpecially in Aſtrologie; for the courſe of many of the celeſtiall bodies could never have beene

beene learned, no not ſo much as in any mediocrity, had not God given ſome of them, at leaſt ſixe hundred yeeres to live in, in which time, the great yeere, as they call it, is fulfilled and perfected. To which wee may adde the fewneſſe of the worlds inhabitants in the beginning of the world, God preventing the diſpeopling of the new world, and providing for its ſtore and repleniſhing. And yet (if wee beleeve *Anacroon*, I know not how credible a witneſſe being a Poet) within theſe few ages laſt paſt, *Arganthonius*, King of the *Tarteſſians*, lived an hundred and fifty yeeres; *Cinyras* of *Cyprus*, an hundred and ſixty yeeres; *Eginus* two hundred; and as *Alexander* and *Cornelius* report, there was one in *Illyricum* called *Dodon*, that lived the full and compleat tearme of ſixe hundred yeeres; and *Xenophon* writeth of one, who in the Iſle of the *Latines* li-

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ved eight hundred yeeres. But I am of opinion with *Pliny*, that it is very unlikely, ſeeing it may be that they erred in their computation, not knowing how according to diverſity of nations in former ages, there were manifold and ſundry meaſures of the yeeres; for the olde Arcadians made fowre yeeres of one of ours, alotting unto every yeere three months. The Ægyptians made as many yeeres as moneths, according to the Moones finiſhed and renewed courſe: and according unto this reckoning, it will bee no ſtrange thing, that a man ſhould even in theſe dayes live a thouſand yeeres. But not to proſecute the divers continuance of things in divers kindes, as alſo to let paſſe the further examination of the decayed eſtate of mans life, leſt wee agayne revive the now quenched fire of godleſſe indignation, at the ſhortneſſe of our life, wee will come to the

moſt pertinent compariſon of man with man in this kinde, if firſt we ſhall onely remember what was *Plinies* opinion of the ſhortning our lives, namely, that God heerby did greatly gratifie us, by cutting off theſe dayes of miſery; agreeable to which, *Silenus* being demanded what was the greateſt happineſſe and good that God could doe a man, made anſwer, *Never to bee borne*; and the next unto that, *to die quickely*.

Chap. XVII.

Cauſes of long life are inward, or outward. Inward, are either naturall or acquiſite as the Simmetry of the foure firſt qualities in the Body, (though Heate and Moiſture are

are directly expreſſed by Ariſtotle.) *The conditions both of qualitie, and quantitie, of ſuch moiſture, as is cauſe of life. The reaſon why ſickly children are afterwards moſt healthfull. Why ripe witted children and the moſt active are ſhorteſt lived. The beſt temperament, what it is. The Sanguine Complexion an indication of long life. The acquiſite are moderation of the affections. The moderation of the affections is either in the regiment of the appetite for meate and drinke, or of the paſſions. How winebibbers commonly haſten their death.*

BUt touching the cauſes of long life, we may thus briefly dichotomiſe them, for they are eyther inward or outward; the inward cauſes are ſuch as eyther wee have naturally ingrafted, or elſe gotten by Art, induſtry, and wiſedome: that of nature is the good temperature and proportionate mixture of the foure firſt qualities in the body; for moderate heat that is unproportionate to the quantity of moyſture, rather haſtneth death by the too ſpeedy conſumption of its moyſt food, then any way prolongeth life, as we ſee in men of cholericke conſtitution. So alſo, too great cold, that is overſwaying the quantity or vertue of our naturall heat, ſhortneth our life: and thence it is that old men the neerer they draw unto their ends, have their bodies overgrowne with cold: whereupon all the Aſtrologians have obſerved

ved *Saturne* to be a Planet Enemy unto life, as having a vertue of colde and drought, and accordingly (as some imagine) was he painted with a sithe in his hand, cutting down as it were, and killing men with the operation and infusion of these two deadly qualities: which may also bee said of the excesse of the other two contrary qualities, moysture and drought; for too much moysture oppresseth the naturall heat, as we see greene wood quench an unequall quantity of fire: and thence it is, that Willowes and such like, whose almost naturall place is the Rivers side, are of short continuance, because their too much and too wateriſh moysture drowneth their heat. So that heereby (as I take it) it is manifest, that none of these qualities, singly and by themselves, are true causes of long life, but joyntly all in a good and just proportion.

Now if any man ſhall (out of *Ariſtotle*) object, that the two qualities of life, namely *heat* and *moyſture*, are only cauſes of long life; wee may anſwer, that theſe two by themſelves procure not length of life, but in a certayne meaſure and proportion. Now the rebater of the heats too too active quality, is his contrary, cold: and the *moderator* and *temperer* of the moyſtures acceſſe is drought: ſo that in every man, the fowre firſt qualities are requiſite; yet were onely two mentioned by *Ariſtotle*, as being thoſe onely which directly cauſe long life; the other two only inclufively ſet downe, as being no otherwiſe effectually profitable for life, then as they temper and abate the exceſſe of the two principall. But becauſe every moyſture is not cauſe of life, nor the beſt moyſture in every quantity, there are one or two requiſit conditions annexed: firſt concerning the

the quality, that it be not too thin and fluid, ſuch as is the naturall diſpoſition of water; but more cleaving and fat, ſuch as may reſemble the nature of oile for its better preſervation from putrifaction: ſecondly, that it have ſome competent degree of heat, to keepe it ſtom congealing; laſt of all, that it be pure, not mingled with excrementall ſuperfluities; foraſmuch as all n i cture of ſuperfluities is againſt nature, enemy to good digeſtion, and ſound nutrition. Thoſe things thus obſerved, our moyſture ſhall bee ſufficiently qualified for our lives mayntaynance. Touching the quantity, in a word, (as is before ſayd) it muſt neyther be exceſſive, leſt the too great quantity oppreſſe our heat, as wee ſee, infuſion of too much oyle, oftentimes puts out the Lampe; nor yet defective, leſt the devouring action of our heat, too ſoone conſume it: but in a competent mediocrity, ſuch

as the heate may neyther overhaſtily vanquiſh, nor with the violence of exceſſive inequality, too ſuddenly be extinguiſhed. Where briefly wee may ſee the reaſon, why man is longer lived than other Creatures of more vaſt bodies; for though in the large capacity of their great receyvers, they have a greater quantity of this naturall moyſture, then is incident unto mans ſmall body, yet have they it not ſo well tempered and proportioned to their heat, which may well bee gathered by their ſlow and ſeldome breathing. So that it is true which the Philoſopher hath, that the great or little quantity of the body, is no ſufficient cauſe of long life. And yet this is withall moſt true, that where there is greateſt ſtore of humidity with a competent proportion of heat, there is greateſt fitneſſe naturally for long life. And that is the reaſon why thoſe that in their infancy, are moſt

moſt ſubject to a languiſhing diſeaſednesſe, are afterward moſt healthfull, and for the moſt part, longeſt lived. For the abundance of their naturall moyſture hindreth the too ſpeedy prevayling of the heat, by reſiſting its action: and ſo is it the leſſe mingled with forren impurities. For as we ſee the Smiths fire, by the moderat ſprinkling of water, though at firſt for a time its force is ſomewhat abated, yet at length, having overcome its weake adverſary, as in triumph, burneth the cleerer, and laſteth longer; ſo fareth it in our bodies: for our heat not able on the ſudden to overſway our multitude of moyſture, is the longer hindred from conſuming it, whence proceedeth long life, and after it hath gotten the upper hand, performeth with more facility its naturall functions, whence commeth healthfulneſſe; where wee may alſo explane that *Probleme*: why children

children that are too ripe witted in their childehood, are for the moſt part eyther ſhorteſt lived, or elſe toward their old age moſt ſottiſh, according to our Proverbe, *Soone ripe, ſoone rotten:* for hence wee may gather, that from the beginning they had but little moyſture, over which their heat ſoone prevayled: for much humidity is cauſe of blockiſhneſſe and folly; whence is that of *Galen*, that *fleame being a colde wateriſh humour, is of no force for ornament of good conditions:* and *Plato* doubted not to ſay, that looke how much moyſture there is in us, ſo much allo is our folly; and therefore it is as the ſame *Plato* obſerveth, that children and women are for the moſt part moſt fooliſh. For the glorious light and Sunne like ſplendor of the Soule, is therwith as with a cloud obſcured and intercepted, which is an evident proofe of the ſmall ſtore of moyſture in theſe quick-witted

witted forward children, over which the heat ſo much the ſooner obtayning dominion, and in proceſſe of time drying the brayne, the ſubordinate inſtrument of underſtanding, eyther quite deſtroyeth it, and ſo bringeth death, or elſe ſo corrupts it, that it is altogether unable and unfit to ſteed the inner ſenſes in their functions, whereon the underſtanding in this priſon of the body principally dependeth: which may no leſſe fitly ſerve for anſwer unto that conſequent demand, why thoſe infants for the moſt part, are ſooneſt able to walke, to talke, to conceive, to remember, and ſuch like; the reaſon is taken from the little quantity of moyſture; which may be gathered by the contrary diſpoſition in the otherwiſe affected ſubjects, as alſo by that which wee ſee in dayly experience, in creatures of other kindes. For whereas man by reaſon of his fluid, unſetled ſubſtance, hath

hath for the better ſtrengthening of his joynts, his body ſwathed, and is a long time before hee is able to ſtand or walke, or performe any ſuch like his vitall functions; we ſee other creatures almoſt in the ſame moment, borne and inabled to ſtand, walke, and ſuch like; for their unequall quantity of heate, prevayling over the little ſtore of moiſture, ſoone fitteth them for the performance of vitall actions, that being the Soules chiefe inſtrument in the diſcharge of her duties. Now if any man ſhall aske what this juſt proportion is, and when they are tempered ſo as may beſt be avayleable for long life, the anſwer is, that heat and moyſture are then well proportioned, when neither the moyſture, with its too great quantity devoureth the heat, nor the overmuch heate, too ſuddenly conſumes and eateth up the moyſture. Yet muſt the heat have a kinde of dominion o-

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ver the moyſture, elſe can it not bee able to nouriſh the body. For in nutrition the thing nouriſhed, by reaſon of the inſtrument ordayned for that purpoſe, muſt actually worke upon that, whereby it is nouriſhed. And becauſe that every Agent muſt bee proportioned unto the patient, in the quality of exceſſe, therefore muſt the heat being the ſoules ſole active inſtrument of nutrition, have dominion over the moyſture, the ſubject matter of that faculty.

25 Touching the complexions, the queſtion is, which of them is beſt diſpoſed and fitted for length of life. To take that for granted which *Fernelius* doubteth of, namely, that there are fowre, if not onely yet chiefly, notable complexions; wee anſwer, that thoſe of a ſanguine conſtitution are by nature capable of the longeſt life; as having the two qualities of life beſt tempered.

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And therefore is compared unto the ayre, which is moderately hot and in the higheſt degree moyſt. Yet not with that too thinne and fluid watriſh moyſture, but more oyly; oyle it ſelfe reſembling the true nature of the ayre. Therefore the ſanguine complexion is fitteſt for long life. For choler is an humour like unto fire, extreame hot, and moderately drie, and ſo unſufficient to make ſupply of moyſture to the devouring operation of that fiery heat, which is in it. In the flegmatick the copiouſneſſe of that humour reſembling water, oppreſſeth the heat, and ſo hindereth good digeſtion, whence proceed crudities in the ſtomacke and liver, from whence they are diffuſed into the veynes, and ſo unto all the parts of the body, and at length the body is overgrowne with corruption. Laſtly, melancholy reſembling the earth and its qualities cold & drought, both

both enemies to life, haſtneth the deſtruction of the body, whereunto it is incident.

The ſecond inward cauſe of long life, is, the moderation of our affections. Whether it be that naturall *appetite* of *meate* and *drinke* for nouriſhment, or thoſe other of *anger*, *love*, *joy*, *luſt*, *ſorrow*, and ſuch like. For all theſe are avayleable both wayes, eyther in exceſſe to kill, or in moderation to ſave. Touching the moderate uſe of meats and drinkes, what need we ſeeke far for proofe of its profitableneſſe to preſerve life, when wee ſee ſo many dayly by ſurfetting and over-charging their ſtomacks with too much, and too riotous uſe of meates, untimely ende their dayes: and contrariwiſe, men very crafie and ſickely, by temperancy and moderation, many times protract their lives almoſt to an incredible length. For ſo it is reported of one

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Herodius, a ſtudent in *Ariſtotle* his days, the moſt weake and ſickly of any that lived in that time, by the teſtimony both of *Plato* and of *Ariſtotle*; who, notwithſtanding, by his diligent care and guidance of himſelfe, lived full out one hundred yeeres; and no marvell, for ſo did hee repayre the dayly decay of his humidity, by ſupply of nouriſhment, and neyther overwhelming his heat, with the abundance of moyſture, nor mingled his radicall moiſture with too much externall ſuperfluous impurities. Where wee may reſolve that doubt, how it comes to paſſe, *that often drinkers of wine, for the moſt part, haſten their death*: The reaſon is, that the vehement heat of the wine, conſumeth their moyſture, and ſo by detraction of the heats food, in time alſo extinguiſheth the heat. Now if any man ſhall require me to preſcribe a diet unto him, though I be no Phyſitian, yet will

will I referre him unto that of the excellent Emperour, who never eate till he was hungry, nor never proceeded to a glutting ſatiety, For the extreames are dangerous both *exceſſe* and *defect*; too much meate hindring good digeſtion and ingendring crudities, and too little giving occaſion of the heats too ſudden prevayling over the moiſture, both which are friends of death: Nor would I counſell men ſtrictly to tye themſelues unto ſet houres; for that, ſayth *Paracelſus* is dangerous, cauſing many times, eyther delay of applying nouriſhment, or too ſpeedy miniſtring before the former digeſtion is finiſhed.

Chap. XVIII.

Of exerciſe, when to be uſed, and how, of the paſsions. Examples of

such as have dyed with suddaine and immoderate joy, and the reason. Examples of such as have dyed for griefe, and the naturall reason. Of venery; and why the immoderate use thereof shorteneth mans dayes.

26 AND heare we may seasonably annex the use of exercise for that is a thing very availeable to digestion, dispersing the nourishment into the parts of the body, and being (as it were) the bellowes to kindle and revive our naturall heate: for overmuch rest and ceasing from motion cooleth the body. And as the elemẽtish fire which we use, unlesse it be somtime blowne and fed as it were with aire is extinguished: so our naturall heat without exercise and motion

motion is after a ſort caſt on ſleepe, or rather benummed, whence proceedeth that other daughter of dulneſſe, *collection of excrementall ſuperfluities*, the heat being not able to digeſt our received nouriſhment; and thence is that corruption and rottennes which overtaketh theſe ſlow-backes; as we ſe ſtanding water ſooneſt putrifie and gather filth. Wherfore *Ariſtotle* enquiring the cauſes of the *toyleſome travel of ſome women in child birth over others*, ſetteth down this as principall among the reſt, namely their idleneſſe and want of exerciſe; for his experience of women in other Countries ſo accuſtomed to paines taking, had taught him; for to them child-bearing was not ſo painefull, their labour conſuming thoſe excrements that are the uſuall impediments of eaſe in that kinde. Nor will I take upon me to limit any man to any kind of exerciſe rather then any other,

or appoint any time; although this caveat will not be amisse prescribed that they use not to stirre themselves more violently than is ordinary before the meat be thorough digested; for then they clogg their stomacks and make them unfit for after concoction, and withall fill their bodyes with raw humors, which by exercise are dispersed through the veines into all parts of the body: onely as in other things, so especially in exercise of what kind soever, eyther for delight, or of paynes, let them remember *moderation*, that it be neither too much, nor too little. Not too much, that is neyther too vehement, nor yet continuall, but interchangeable, for both these by consuming of the spirits, are alike hurtfull, not too little, for continued rest and idlenesse (as is aforesayd) engendreth putrifaction. Where the consideration of the moderate use of sleepe and waking

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ing is very incident, for they are both things neceſſary for maintainance of life in their mediocrity, both as hurtfull if beyond meaſure. For immoderate and unſeaſonable watching waſteth the Spirits, and by conſuming of the vitall juyce, cauſeth leanneſſe in the body, enfeebleth the parts thereof, hindreth the operation of the ſenſes, dryeth the marrow and the braine: inſomuch that oftentimes it proceedeth to doting and frenſie. So likewiſe too much ſleepe hindreth our health and welfare by looſing the parts of the body, dulling the naturall heat, conſuming the moyſture, and ſuch like. But moderately uſed and interchangeably they are notable meanes of procuring and preſerving health, not onely becauſe this variety and change is very delightſome and refreſhing, but much more by reſtoring or hindring the decay of Nature.

27 Now touching theſe other affections, as *anger*, *joy*, *ſorrow*, and ſuch like, though we read not of many that have ſuddainly dyed for anger, yet by reaſon of that ſudden emiſſion of heat into the outward parts of the body, and kindling as it were the fire of choler, it muſt needs be very hurtfull, when as all ſuddenneſſe, eſpecially joyned with vehemency is an horrour unto nature. And choler inflameth the bloud, whence proceedeth that unreaſonableneſſe and raging, uſually obſerved in men overmuch angred. But examples are plentiful of ſuch as with ſuddaine and immoderate joy have dyed; as *Pliny* reports of *Sophocles* and *Dionyſius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant, that immdiately upon tydings of victory gave up the Ghoſt. And *Livie* maketh mention of two mothers at Rome, that after the bloudy battell of *Cannas*, for joy the ſafe and unexpected returne of their Sonnes

Sonnes, ſuddenly fell downe dead, the one meeting her ſonne at the City gate, the other in her houſe bewayling the reported death of her ſonne, when on the ſudden beſide her expectation, hee ſafely preſented himſelfe to her ſight. The like alſo *Gellius* writeth of one *Diogenes* of Rhodes, that having his three Sonnes, for the maſtery obtained at the games, in one day crowned, after his ſonnes imbracements and the peoples applauſe, ſuddenly yeelded up the Ghoſt. The meanes of this death, was the ſudden dilatation of the heart, the vitall ſpirits and the heat whoſe beginning is the heart, being too farre caried from their fountaine. So alſo read we of *Ariſtotle*, that not able to finde the reaſon why *Euripus* (a part of the ſea ſcituated betweene *Aulis* of *Bootia* and *Eubœa*) ebbed and flowed ſeven times a day, for very griefe dyed: the the meanes and maner of his death be-

ing the too great contraction of the ſpirits, wherby the heat was as it were with ſmoke choaked. The like is reported of *Diodorus* a Logitian, who for ſhame that he could not at the firſt anſwer the tryfling queſtion which *Stilpo* put out, ſuddenly ended his dayes. Which is alſo written of *Homer*, who in the Iſle *Ios* ſitting on the Sea ſhore, demanded of the fiſher-men if they had taken any thing, they thus obſcurely in riddle-wiſe made anſwer; *Thoſe that wee tooke wee left behind, thoſe that wee could not catch, we bring with us.* For in the ſun-ſhine (as they ſay, it is ſhipmens faſhiõs) they made inquiſition for their backbiting familiars, and ſome they tooke and cruelly preſſed unto death, leaving their liveleſſe carcaſes to be devoured of the fiſhes: thoſe that craftily had inſinuated themſelves eyther into their fleſh, or into the inſide of their apparell, they were faine to bring away

away with them. But quicke-witted *Homer*, not able on the ſudden to expound this Probleme, for ſhame, gave up the Ghoſt. For the ſpirits and blood retiring to the inward parts, as to a Tower of defence, by their ſudden retreat, and reverberation, redouble the heat, and ſo inflaming the heart, not able to be cooled againe by reſpiration, ſtifles the Patient.

28 Concerning Venery, deathes beſt harbinger, I ſhall not neede to recite the infinite examples of them, that by meanes thereof have haſtened their deaths; nor indeede is it poſſible to number thoſe innumerable troopes that through luſt eyther before the actuall accompliſhment, or after the too frequent ſatisfying the ſame, have ended their youthfull dayes. It was well ſayd of one, That *Venus provideth not for thoſe that are already borne, but for thoſe that ſhall bee borne*: and therefore

fore *Avicenna*, a learned *Philoſopher*, and *Phyſitian*, doubted not to ſay, that the emiſſion of a little ſeed more then the body could well beare was a great deale more hurtfull then the loſſe of forty times ſo much bloud. For it waſteth the Spirits, weakeneth the ſtomacke, enfeebleth and drieth up the brayne and marrow, whereby eſpecially it haſtneth death. And the trueth heereof *Ariſtotle* prooveth by his experimentall obſervation, for ſo hath hee noted the Cocke-ſparrow by immoderate and too frequent uſe of Venery, very ſeldome to live out the tearme of two yeeres; and the ſame reaſon he giveth, why the Mule a mixt creature, begotten betweene an Horſe and an Aſſe, is longer lived than either of them; for his luſting in that kind, is but once onely through the whole courſe of his life. To which wee may adde the diverſity of the ſexe; for the male,

male, according unto *Ariſtotle*, in every kinde almoſt, is by nature better fitted for long life then the female, having greater force of heate, and the moyſture more firme and better able to reſiſt, then the fluid ſubſtance of the female: and thence it is that women for the moſt part, are ſooner perfected then men, being ſooner fit for generation, ſooner in the flower and prime of their age, and finally ſooner old, for their heat, though little, yet ſooner prevayleth over that fluid thinne ſubſtance and moyſture of theirs, then it poſſibly can ever that ſolid and compact humidity which is in man.

Chap. XIX.

The outward cauſes of long life. The influences of the Starres, and of their

their operations. **The** *Aſtrologers reaſon why the octimeſtriall birth doth not live.* **The** *quality of the Soyle, and wholeſomeneſſe of the Ayre, cauſes of long life.* **The** *Ayre is to be choſen and adjudged fit by the temperament of the perſon.* **Ariſtotles** *reaſon why Northren men are ſtrongeſt. A contradiction of his, reconciled.* **The** *cauſes of ſhort life.*

29 BUt leſt our Treatiſe grow too bigge, wee will proceede to thoſe other outward cauſes of long life, ſuch as bee the influences of the Starres; eyther in our conception and birth, or in the country and ſoyle wherein we live, as alſo the goodneſſe of the Soyle it ſelf, both

both of the Earth and Ayre. For though it be true that the celeſtiall bodies have no direct action eyther of inclination or conſtraint upon the reaſonable Soule of man, which is immateriall, yet is it as true that they have ſingular and eſpecially operations upon our bodies; for ſo we ſee the fruitfulneſſe and barrenneſſe of the Earth depends upon the heavens good and bad aſpect; the Sea followes the motion and alteration of the Moone, the yeere diſtinguiſhed into its fowre parts, according to the acceſſe or further abſence of the Sunne; and therefore *Galen*, the Father of Phyſitians, counſelled his Scholers, to have eſpeciall reſpect unto the conjunction of the Planets in their ſignes, whenſoever they undertake any cure: and, which is more fit for the preſent purpoſe, the Aſtrologers have aſſigned unto every Planet a monethly dominion over the childe conceyved

conceyved in the wombe, according to their order and ſcituation. The firſt Moneth is alotted unto *Saturne*; the ſecond unto *Iupiter*, and ſo foorth in order, untill they have all finiſhed their dominion, and then they begin again: which is the ſpeciall reaſon alleadged by ſome, why the childe that is borne in the eight moneth, for the moſt part dieth, when as oftentimes thoſe that are brought foorth a Moneth ſooner or later, live in very good health: for *Saturne* is a Planet, whoſe influence cauſeth cold and drineſſe, which both are qualities enemies unto life. Now followeth the laſt, though not the leaſt cauſe of long life, and that is the goodneſſe of the ſoile, and wholeſomneſſe of the ayre; for it is ſo recorded in Hiſtories, and approoved by the teſtimony of our late Travellers, that in that part of *India*, which is called *Oner*, the inhabitants are very long lived,

ved, and for the moſt part very healthfull, inſomuch that many of them live untill they be above an hundred yeers old; and we ſee by experience in our owne Country, how perillous not only peſtilent ayre is, but even the unwholeſomneſſe of the fenny Countreyes, that are often annoyed with ſtincking and unſavoury fogges. *Ariſtotle* in his Treatiſe of the length and ſhortneſſe of life, maketh choyce of a hot Countrey, as fitteſt for preſervation and mayntenance of life; for ſo he obſerveth it, that ſerpents bredde and brought up in hot Countreyes, are generally bigger bodyed, then thoſe that are found in colder climats: and thoſe fiſhes which breed in the red Sea, are alſo longer then thoſe in the Seas that are not ſo hot, and that though they be of the ſame kinde: which is a manifeſt prooſe of their longer continuance: elſe how commeth it to paſſe, that they have

have greater growth: and again, thoſe Creatures that live in colde climates, have a more wateriſh kinde of humor, and fitter for congealation, whence followeth the ſpeedier deſtruction of the inhabitants: but the truth is, that neyther hot Countreyes, nor colder climats, are of themſelves any furtherance unto long life; for thoſe that are of a cholericke fiery conſtitution, live longer in cold Countreyes, and ſuch as be of colder complexion, live beſt, and longeſt in hot Regions, but according to the diverſity of mens complexions, ſo live they better or worſe in divers Countries. Thoſe that are too hot of conſtitution, by my counſell, ſhall make choyce of a Country in ſome meaſure and degrees cold, leſt the outward heat of the circumjacent ayre, increaſe the fire within, and make it more vehement; and thence is it that thoſe in the hotteſt part of *Ethiopia* are

ſhorteſt

ſhorteſt lived, having that naturall exceſſe of heat ſet on fire with the acceſſe of the externall heat of the ayre. Now for ſuch as abounde with too much moyſture, their beſt habitation, in my judgement, is in hot and dry Regions, that the heat and drought of the Soile, may abate the ſuperfluity of the humour. But there are ſome of a moderate and well proportioned conſtitution, and if any man ſhall aske what Countrey is beſt for them to dwell in, I anſwer, that there are two ſorts of men thus tempered; ſome are of a more weake and leſſe hardy diſpoſition, and to them I would preſcribe a convenient dwelling in Countries rather hot then cold, that the heat of the place may comfort and ſtrengthen the heat of their bodyes. Others againe are more hardy and better able to endure any not extreame violence of cold; and for them it is beſt to live in

colder Climates, for ſo is their heate better enabled to performe its functions of diſgeſtion, and ſuch like; and therfore *Ariſtotle* in his Politicks ſaith, That Northren men, and generally ſuch as dwell in colder Countreyes, are ſtronger and bigger bodyed, and moſt an end better couraged, and longer lived: for the coldneſſe of the compaſſing ayre, reflects the heat inot the inward parts, and by that reflection, the heats force is increaſed, and the parts gathered better and cloſer together, which both further the performance of its duties. And that is the reaſon why men in Winter are more hungry and devouring, then in Summer, as experience teacheth us all: for the ſtomacke is ſtrengthened by the heats compreſſion, to the better concocting of the receyved nouriſhment. Thus therfore may we conclude with the expoſition of *Ariſtotle* his opinion

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in this caſe, when hee ſayth, that hot places are fitteſt for long life, in his booke of the *Length and ſhortneſſe of mans life*; and in his Politickes, *The inhabitants of colder Climates, are ſtronger and longer lived*: for thus may wee reconcile this apparant contradiction: that for men of more colde complexions, hot places are moſt preſervative and healthfull; and for the contrary complexioned men, contrary affected places; ſo that, if two of the ſame conſtitution (imagine them both to bee hot) live, the one in a cold, the other in a hot Region (if their heat was not accordingly proportioned to their moyſture, but unequally in the exceſſe) hee that made choice of the colder habitation, provided beſt for his life. And thus have wee briefly ſet downe the common receyved cauſes of long life, where-out by the conſequence of contraries wee may deduce the cauſes

of ſhort life. And they are, firſt the ſmall quantity and watriſhneſſe of the moyſture. Secondly, the ſuperfluous abundance of excrements. Thirdly, the badneſſe and unwholeſomneſſe of the Soyle. Fourthly, the ungentle aſpects of the Starres, that ruled eyther in our conception or birth. Fifthly, want of good nouriſhment. Sixthly, intemperance eyther in our diet, or exerciſe, or obeying our affections. To which ſome adde the fewneſſe or tenderneſſe of Teeth, for that is a ſigne of thickeneſſe in the Bone of the head, the matter alotted to the teeths generation, being turned into the ſubſtance of the skull, which alſo importeth the weakeneſſe of the Brayne, which is by meanes thereof unfit for breathing, and therefore being of a moyſt diſpoſition, the more fit for putrifaction, as ſtanding waters ſooneſt putrifie and gather filth: but this I take rather for a ſigne then a cauſe of ſhort life.

Chap. XX.

An Age defined. The temperament of the body defined. The variation of our originall conſtitution, the proper cauſe of alteration of the complexion. Pythagoras *divides the Ages of men, into fowre kindes*; Ariſtotle *into three. The Infancy is hotteſt and moyſteſt, yet the ſuperabounding moyſture ſuppreſſeth the evident apparance of heat. The flouriſhing ſtate is moſt temperate. Childhood defined, and divided into Infancy, Boy-hood, the budding*

age, and youth. The flouriſhing age deſcribed and divided into the prime and manhood. Old Age defined, and dichotomiſed. The dominion of the planets over the body, in its ſeverall ages.

30 NOw come we to that we firſt and principally intended, to ſhew the differences of mens ages, and the cauſes thereof, together with their ſeverall and ſingular properties, wherein wee will deale ſo much the more ſparingly by reaſon of thoſe doubts and difficulties removed in the former part of the Treatiſe, ſo that we ſhall not neede to digreſſe into any by-controverſies, but keepe a direct and ſtraight courſe. And to begin with the Definition (for more orderly proceeding) it may thus briefly be

be described : *An Age is a period and tearme of a mans life, wherein his naturall complexion and temperature naturally and of its owne accord is evidently changed.* For such is the disposition and nature of our body, that by the continuall combat and interchangeable dominion of the ever-jarring elements, it often changeth its primary constitution, so that though there were no outward cause of transmutation, which notwithstanding are many and manifold, yet have wee that home-bred cause within us, that would in time alter our temperature ; for our naturall heat uncessantly working upon our naturall moysture, doth, though not suddenly, change the proportion into extreams, yet by degrees perceivably prevayleth more and more over the humidity. For so wee see the same body in our youth and childe hood, diversly tempered, our *infancy* full of moysture, as the flu-

id ſoft ſubſtance of our fleſh manifeſtly declareth: our *Youth* bringeth a farther degree of ſolidity: our *riper age* ever temperate; thence ſtill declineth our body unto cold and drineſſe, till at length death ceaſeth upon our bodies, being the laſt end and period of our life. But every ſlight change of the fowre qualities proportion changeth not our temperature, for then wee ſhould every day have a divers complexion, our bodies eftſoone with wine and exerciſe changed from colde to heat, and by the contrary from heat to cold: yet by reaſon of the ſhort indurance of theſe diſtemperatures, the body returning to its former conſtitution, we cannot ſay there is a new complexion wrought in the body: for a temperature or complexion is *a firme and ſtanding habit of the body.* Nor yet muſt we imagine the talneſſe & growing of the body, or the new budding of hayres,

hayres, to bee cauſes ſufficient to procure this diſtinction; but the variation of our originall conſtitution, is the true and proper cauſe of this diverſity and difference. And yet not every change of the complexion, but that which only proceedeth from that inwardly ingendred cauſe of deſtructions; for many times by the unſeaſonable and immoderate heat of the ayre, as alſo by intemperate and riotous living, men even in the moſt milde and temperate Countreyes, alter their complexions, and with the Æthiopian, become even decrepit old men, (if we reſpect their conſtitutions, and thoſe other incident qualities of old age) before they have finiſhed the full tearme of thirty yeers: and therefore was it added in the deſcription, that it muſt be a naturall and a ſelfe-alteration. Now according to theſe naturall and evident alterations of heat and moyſtures proportion, ſo may

may we beſt and moſt properly divide the ages. *Pythagoras* divides them into fowre kindes, or rather ſetteth downe their number, which be, according to his reckoning, fowre in number, *Childhood*, *Youth*, *Man-hoode*, *and Olde-age*, proportioning our life to the fowre parts of the yeere, our *Childe-hoode* to the *Spring*, wherein all things together with a pleaſant verdour and greeneſſe and by a plentifull ſupply of moyſture continually increaſe in growth. Our *Youth* unto *Summer*, for that growne ſtrength of the body and minde. Our *Man-age* unto the *Autumne* or *Harveſt*, when after the manifold turmoyles and dangers of our fore-ſpent life, the good gifts and indowements of our minde (as we ſee it fall out in the fruits of Nature) receive a kinde of ſeaſonable and kindly ripeneſſe. Our *Old Age* hee reſembleth unto the cold and troubleſome *Winter ſeaſon*, very fitly thereby

by expreſſing the cumberſome coldneſſe of the latter end of our life. *Ariſtotle* ſetteth downe only three diſtinct ages, *Child-hood*, *flouriſhing Man-age*, and *Olde-age*; the firſt plentifully abounding with heat and moyſture, the middle age having the ſame two qualities of life, aſwell tempered as their nature poſſibly can be; old age declining and ſwarving from that good and moderate temper, and by little and little decaying in both theſe qualities, till at length they be both of them conſumed. Now that our life is thus often, and thus in order changed in the temperature, it will eaſily appeare, if wee conſider the matter whereof we are all made, and that is *ſemen & ſanguis parentum*, both abounding with heat and moyſture, whereout ariſeth this Conſequence, that in the firſt entrance into life, wee have greateſt ſtore of thoſe two lively qualities, which decay not but

our by length of time; and that in our Infancy wee are fulleſt of moyſture, our experience and ſenſe teacheth us, for ſo wee ſee infants fleſh moſt fluid and almoſt of a waxen diſpoſition, ready to receive impreſſion of any light touch; and as for heat, *Galen* and *Hippocrates* both conſent, that *man is moſt hot in the firſt day of his birth*, though by reaſon of the great ſtore of moyſture, the heats power doth not ſo evidently appeare: and becauſe the heat without any the leaſt intermiſſion or pauſe, worketh upon our moyſture, and by little and little conſumeth it, it ſelfe alſo in time decaying, who ſeeth not, that the beſt part of our life, even neceſſarily is moſt cold and drie? whence alſo this may be inferred, that the ſpace betweene the two extreames, is moſt temperate, forasmuch as *Nature never paſſeth from one extreame vnto the other, but by the meane*: and this is the warrant

rant of *Ariſtotles* tripartite diviſion of ages; the ſeverals are thus briefly defined.

31 *Childhood is the firſt part and age of a mans life, wherein their generation and growth is perfected*, and this laſteth (for the moſt part) untill we be five and twenty yeeres old, and this age is proportionable unto the *Spring*, hot and moyſt, for in this time our naturall heat ſupplyeth great ſtore of vitall aerie moyſture, from the nouriſhment received, that was ſpent of that our naturall ſtore; and thence it is, that within compaſſe of this time, our bodies grow bigger and taller. But according to the ſucceſſive decay and diminution of our heate and moyſture, it hath pleaſed *Antiquity* to point out certaine degrees of this firſt age; the firſt is our Infancie, and that laſteth untill the third or fourth yeere of our life, and is alwayes beſt ſtored with moiſture: the

the next is our Boy-hood, and that lasteth other five yeeres: the third our *budding* and *blossoming age*, when our cheekes and other more hidden parts begin to be clothed with that mossie excrement of haire, which is prorogued untill the eighteenth yeere: the last our *youth*, lasting untill we be five and twenty yeeres old; and these are the parts of our growing age. The next is our *Flourishing* and *middle age*, and this is, when a man is come to the highest degree of perfection in the temper of his body, and continueth in that flourishing livelinesse, without any notorious decay or impayring his heat, supplying the just quantity of moisture from the nourishment, which in the former action of it, was consumed; and this is compared to the *Summer*, hot and dry, or rather moderately moyst, dry onely in comparison of the former age, not simply, least the heat should too

too ſoone diſſolve the body; and this alſo hath parts; the firſt is our *Youth*, for ſo (the penury of our Engliſh tongue warranteth me to call it) when our growth is ſtayd, and our naturall heat beginneth to be moſt flouriſhing; you may call it our *Prime*, for then indeed are we in our prime and moſt flouriſhing eſtate; it laſteth from the five and twentieth to the five and thirtieth or fortieth yeare of our life: the ſecond part of our middle age, is our *Manhood*, the moſt conſtant and ſetled part of our life, as having our life-qualities moſt firm and in greateſt mediocrity, wherein notwithſtanding our naturall heat begins a little to decay and decline from its vigour; yet ſo, as it cannot by ſenſe be perceived, and this laſteth often times till we be fiftie yeeres old. The laſt is *Old-age*, when not onely the augmentative faculty of the Soule ceaſeth to increaſe the quantity

tity of our bodyes but alſo by reaſon of our heats and moiſtures decay, there is a manifeſt declining from our former luſtineſſe and livelyhood, our bodyly ſtrength together with the weake and feeble operations of our Soule in her functions ſenſibly impayred. And this laſt part of our life is reſembled unto *Winter*, for that although it be in it ſelfe hot and moiſt, (as life conſiſteth wholly in theſe two qualities) yet in compariſon of the former ages, and in regard of death, unto which it leadeth us, is accounted cold, and this hath alſo its degrees or parts: the firſt wherin our ſtrength and heat are evidently impayred, yet not ſo much, but that there remaineth a will and readineſſe to be doing; and this laſteth uſually from our fiftieth yeere unto our thre-ſcore and five. The ſecond part of this laſt part of our life, which they call decrepit old age, is when our ſtrength and heat

is

is ſo farre decayed, that not onely all ability is taken away, but even all willingneſſe, to the leaſt ſtrength and motion of our body: and this is the concluſion and end of our life, reſembling death it ſelfe, whoſe harbinger and fore-runner it is: and ſo have we ſeven ſeverall parts of our life, compriſing our *Pubertatem* and *adoleſcentiam*, under one: accordingly whereto the Aſtrologers have aſſigned to every of them their peculiar predominant Planet: our *Infant* age is allotted to the *Moones* middle and moyſt dominion, cherſhing us with her ſweet influence which ſhe hath eſpecially upon moyſt bodies: our *Boy hood*, *Mercury* hath charge over, inclining us to *ſportfulneſſe*, *talke*, and *learning*: *Venus* guides our bloſſoming *luſtfull age*: our youthfull *prime*, by the *Sunnes* lively operation is lifted up from baſe delights, to a loftier and more man-like reſolution

and livelineſſe. *Mars* the ſterne God of warre, hath the precincts of his dominion limited within compaſſe of our *Man age*, adding courage to our livelihood, and whetting our otherwiſe dull ſpirits, unto a more ventrous boldneſſe in quarelling combats: *Old age* from *Iupiter* receiveth gravitie and ſtaydneſſe: Decrepit *crooked age*, from the angry aſpect of dry *Saturne*, ſucketh the poyſonous infirmities of craſie ſickneſſe, and wayward pettiſhnes: and this is briefly the ſummary, explication of the differences of mans ages, and the cauſes of this diſtinctiō, together with thoſe properties which the Aſtrologians miſtically and darkly have propounded, as proper and peculiar to every and all of them, to which if we adde the expoſition of ſome few Problems incident to this Treatiſe, we will preſently annex our Epilogue.

Chap.

Chap. XXI.

A reſolution of ſome problems. Firſt, Why man is borne crying. Of which are aſigned three naturall reaſons: beſides the common one. Secondly, why Infants are more ſleepy, then afterwards. For which are aſſigned three reaſons. Thirdly, why the naturall vitall actions are ſo powerfull in Infants, and the reſt ſoe feeble, two reaſons. Fourthly, Why Children have ſhort memories, The reaſon. Fiftly, whether ſpeech procedeth from nature, or diſcipline. Sixtly, why

have noe actuall use of reason: the cause. Seventhly, why waspish Children, are shorteſt lived. Eyghtly, why children breath faſter then men. Ninthly, why wee are more happy in youth then in our declining age. Tenthly why old men are soe ſuſpitious. Eleaventh why old men are moſt covetous. Twelfth, why old men are ſo talkative. Thirteen, why old men are graye. An eſpeciall reaſon of Ariſtotles. A remarkeable Hiſtorie.

32 THe firſt doubt is, *What the reaſon may bee of our crying and lamenting at our very firſt entrance into the world.*

There

There are that attribute this mourning unto a devining, and naturall forefeeling as it were of the calamities to come: but I rather thinke it ariseth from those infirmities and griefes which we presently feele, as well for want of some good thing which we desire, as also for some mislike and grievance of som incumbent misery: as first, that violent motion from that before so quietly injoyed Bed (as it were) in the wombe. Secondly, the straight narrownesse of that passage by which wee enter into the world. Thirdly, the cold and hungry entertainement which we haue, driven out of our warme harbour, in the close imperceivable habitation of our Mothers Wombe, and barred of that nourishment which wee before had unceassantly ministred unto us; and thence is it that presently we betake our selvs to that *Darybouse* of Nature, even by a naturall instinct and directi-

on, where when we have well battled our ſelves, and by the enwrapping in our clothes, are armed againſt the cold ayers injuries, our begunne lamentations are pacified and turned into a quiet contentednesse.

33 Secondly, it may bee demanded, *Why children in their ſucking age are naturally more given unto ſleepe, then when they be of more ripe yeeres.* The reaſon is, Natures Mother-like providence that for the better ſtrengthening and ſpeedier perfection of her offſpring, uſeth this as a meanes to increaſe the vertue and operation of the heat, and for that purpoſe hath ſtored their head with moyſt vapours, fitted through their rarity and thinneſſe, for the brains coole operation upon them. For as united forces are ſtrongeſt, eyther for aſſault or reſiſtance, ſo the ſcattering diſcontinuity of the thin vapours is an occaſion of the colds eaſier impreſſion,

impreſſion, and ſo of their thickening and better ſtopping of the paſſages of the ſpirits unto the outward ſenſes. Another cauſe may be, the brayns coldneſſe, as having in ſo little time receyved no great annoyance from the ſtomackes diſtemperature, it ſelfe alſo abounding with moyſture and fit matter for procuring of ſleepe. Thirdly, the good diſgeſtion of that mild milky ſubſtance, whence aſcendeth into the head the ſoundeſt and moſt pure exhalations. And therefore are their ſleeps (for the moſt part) without any the leaſt paynefulneſſe and moleſtation, whereas contrarily we ſee ſurcharged ſtomackes breed unquiet ſleepes.

34 Thirdly, the queſtion may be, *Why the naturall vitall actions, as nutrition, augmentation, and ſuch like, are in Infants ſo powerfull, and thoſe other of ſenſe ſo feeble and uneffectuall.* The anſwer is, that the good performance of thoſe

actions of life dependeth principally upon our naturall heat; for our Soule, the prince of our body, hath assigned to our heat, the administration and ordering of that province: no marvell therefore if those duties bee well performed in our infancy, when the author of them is at that time most powerfull and plentifull. Now the reason of the senses weake operation is the fewnesse of spirits deputed to that function: for the instrumentall spirits of sense being to bee made in the shop or workehouse of the brayne by the brayne, that excellent spirituall artificer, the workeman howsoever he bee his craftsmaster, as having beene Natures Apprentice, yet by reason of his imbecility and weakenesse, is not able in so short a space to make many, or at least not so forcible instruments, as may serve for the high function and duty of the Soule. To which we may

adde

adde the abundance of moiſture, wherwith the celles of the brayne are in our infancy overflowne, hindring the actions of the Soules ſenſitive parts, and dulling her thereto ordayned faculties.

35 Where alſo we have opportunity to reſolve a fourth doubt, *Why children have ſo ſlippery and ſhort memories.* The reaſon therof is, their brains too great humidity, whereby it is diſabled to keepe the impreſſions of the outward ſenſes objects. For there are two eſpeciall annoyances of the braine that hinder our memorative faculties, immoderate drineſſe, and too great moyſture. For the exceſſe of drought cauſeth the exceſſe of hardneſſe to reſiſt the impreſſions. And therefore it is, that old men for the moſt part have ſo bad memories, their naturall moyſture being by the heats long continued operation almoſt waſted. And *Galen*

len in his Treatiſe of the *Memories faylting becauſe of drineſſe*, maketh mention of a Student, that through immoderate watching and ſtudiouſneſſe, had ſo exceſſively dried his brayne, that hee had almoſt quite loſt his remembrance: as alſo of a husbandman, that by too much paines in that his painfull vocation, and the ſlenderneſſe of hungry fare, was in danger of the like forgetting inconvenience. And as dryneſſe by not admitting the impreſſion, is an impediment to the memory, ſo is alſo too much moyſture by not preſerving the imprinted *ſpecies*. For ſo we ſee water, howſoever moſt yeelding, yet leaſt fit to retayne any figure imprinted. Children therfore ſo moiſt brayned, muſt needs be ſhort remembranced.

36 The next queſtion is, *Whether ſpeech be naturall or wholly from diſcipline.* The anſwer is, that it is naturall, as vertue

vertue and other good habits bee, nature having given a diſpoſition and fitneſſe, together with inſtruments fit for that purpoſe. But as waxe howſoever capable of any impreſſion by reaſon of its pliable nature, yet without the putting to of ſome outwarde Seale, hath no actuall print or reſemblance of any thing; ſo our nature, though as fit to receive any thing taught, as wax is to receive impreſſion from the Seale, yet without the helpe of ſome outward inſtructer, is not actually and fully indowed with any how proper ſoever a quality, eſpecially ſuch as are avayleable for knowledge. In the which kind this of ſpeech hath a ſpeciall prerogative: but leſt I ſhould ſeeme to be needleſly buſied in this queſtion, I referre the Reader for his further ſatisfaction, to that excellent French Poet *Du Bartas*, in his Babylon, Engliſhed by Maſter *William L'Iſle*.

37 A ſixth queſtion is, *Why children in their infancy have no actuall evident uſe of their reaſon.* The cauſe is, the abundance of moyſture incident to that age, whereby the functions of the inward ſenſes, as with a cloud, are eyther obſcured, or elſe quite hindered; whence was that forementioned ſpeech of the learned *Plato*, *That there is a little mixture of folly and moyſture in man:* and therefore *Galen* was wont to ſay, that *flegme* the moſt wateriſh *of all humours, was little or nothing profitable for the attainment of learning.* In the ſeventh place it is demanded, why *Children moſt freſull, are uſually ſhorteſt lived?* The reaſon is, their plenty of heat in compariſon of their ſmall ſtore of moyſture; for therefore are cholericke complexioned men moſt pettiſh, becauſe their bloud is by the fiery heat of that humour ſo ſoone inflamed: wherupon the Egyptians avouched the

Flie

Flie to be the *Hieroglyphicke* of *anger*, and *pertinacy*; becauſe (as *Pierius* obſerveth) it is of ſo cholericke and fiery a diſpoſition, and we ſee in experience men in anger fiery coloured, which proceeds from their heats inflaming of the bloud. Now heat unproportioned unto the moyſture, (as is aforeſayde) quickly conſumeth that ſmall ſtore of moyſture provided for its foode, and ſo procureth death.

38 To theſe may bee added, that well known Problem of *Ariſtotle*: why *Children breath faſter and with leſſe intermiſſion, then doe better grewne men.* The anſwer is, their great ſtore of heat in compariſon of that ſmall meaſure in the after-ages, cauſeth nature for its better preſervation, to draw the ayre oftner for the cooling of the hearts heat; and that is the reaſon that men who have beene any long time troubled with an Ague, or any ſuch like diſtemperature

ſtemperature, are alwayes very ſhort winded: the contrary *Ariſtotle* witneſſeth to follow, in things contrarily affected, for ſo hee prooveth the Horſe and Oxe not to have ſo much heate in them, becauſe they take not their breath ſo thicke together; implying that the cold temper of the heart and other inwards, is cauſe of longer breath; which is alſo evident in reaſon, for the attraction and emiſſion of the ayre, being ordayned only for the cooling and tempering of the hearts heat, according to the neceſſity thereof, muſt breathing be eyther oftner or more ſeldome. *What is the reaſon that in our youth wee are more hungry, and have a greater deſire of meat, then in our declining and elder ages?* The reaſon is, our ſound and ſpeedy diſgeſtion of fore-receyved nouriſhment performed by means of our naturall heat, whence ariſeth a new ſucking of the veynes, and

and ſo an incitement of the appetite.

Whence is it that old men are commonly ſo jealouſly ſuſpicious? The cauſe is, their incredulity and hardneſſe of beliefe, which it ſelfe alſo proceedeth from their much experience of mens wily practiſes, according to that, *The burnt childe dreadeth the fire.* For ſuch is the extreame badneſſe of our nature, that ſtill wee goe from one extreame unto another; and ſo become of men extreamely credulous, in our laſt age extreamely ſuſpitious. And that indeed was *Ariſtotles* remedy, who *to draw us from Covetouſneſſe, biddes us incline vnto Prodigality:* and yet onely with this condition, if we cannot at the firſt inſtant after our long cuſtome in the one extreame, light upon the mediocrity betweene both. *What maketh them ſo ſottiſhly devoted to the things of this world; that when they are nereſt unto death, they are moſt deſirous not onely to*

keepe

keepe that which before they had gotten, but more and more to increase their store? The reason is given by *Aristotle* in his Rhetoricks, and it is their exceeding great desire of life, even after those many dayes which they have forespent. Whence proceedeth that other inordinate desire of things necessary for life maintenance, they having in their experience observed how hardly things necessary are gotten, how easily also they are lost. What is the cause, why *Old men are so talkative and full of words?* Either because nature loves to exercise that part most which is least decayed: or that knowledge, the only thing old age can bragge of, cannot be manifested, but by utterance: or that old men, the nigher they are to their end, they much more desire to have theyr memory not onely by children and posterity, but even by the speches and deeds fore-uttered, and performed in theyr life:

life: or that wiſedome (as all good things naturally communicate theyr good properties) makes them deſirous to profit orhers.

39 *Whence is that froſty hoarineſſe that uſually ligheth upon mens heads in the winter and coldeſt age of their life?* There are ſome that imagine it to proceed from the drieneſſe of thoſe excrements: which alſo they goe about to proove by the like experiment in bones, which after theyr humor is drawne out by ſeething, grow more and more white, till at length they com unto a perfect and full whiteneſſe. But the untrue reſolution of the doubt propounded, is thereby diſcovered, becauſe that men who uſe to cover their haire, are ſooner gray-headed than thoſe that uſe no covering, when as notwithſtanding it is manifeſt, that covered haire hath more ſtore of moyſture, than that which hath beene expoſed unto the

injurious toſſing of the wind, and the ſcorching heat of the Sunne, Therefore I rather allow of *Ariſtotles* reaſon, namely the putrifaction of that excrementall humour, whereof our haire is made: for our naturall heat through its unintermitted operation, being diſabled fully to diſgeſt that excrement ſent from within to that outmoſt covering, our skin, for the haires nouriſhment, it putrifieth and corrupteth. Now that there is ſuch a rottenneſſe and putrifaction in the haire, it is evident by experience of ſuch as by long ſickneſſe have become untimely gray-headded; for after the recovery of theyr diſeaſe, the feebleneſſe of their heate being together with their health reſtored, the hayre receyves its former flouriſhing and (that I may ſo ſpeake) unwaſted greeneneſſe, which reſtitution can bee attributed unto no other cauſe, but only to the through concoction of that undigeſted

undigeſted excrement by the reſtored heat. The like whereof we ſee alſo in corne and graſſe, that having loſt its flouriſhing greeneneſſe, by the continuall beating upon and overwhelming of the waters, afterward being by the Sunnes lively heat cheriſhed and revived, reſumeth its naturall vigour and virility. And that this hoary-headedneſſe proceeds from a defect of heate, it is further evidenced by a ſtrange example recorded by *Scaliger*, of a man who in one nights ſpace had his heade overgrowne with hoarineſſe. The cauſe was this: The Prince of *Mantova, Francis Gonzaga*, had upon ſuſpicion of trayterous conſpiracy, eyther againſt his perſon or State, impriſoned one of his kinne and alliance, that for his age was wholly uncapable of that alteration: and upon the next morrow newes was brought unto the Prince, that his heade was all upon the ſudden

growne hoarily gray ; which almoſt miraculous alteration moved the Princes minde to grant him life and free uſe of his former liberty. Now if any man ſhould demand the reaſon of this ſudden change, it is given by the Philoſophers, and is nothing elſe but the extremity of his griefe and feare, whence proceeded that withdrawing of the diſperſed heat unto the inward parts, and ſo was the humorous nouriſhment of the haire for want of concoction turned into rottennеſſe.

40 And thus have wee briefly run over the diverſities of Mans ages, together with the true cauſes and properties of the particulars, having premiſed the determination of thoſe uſually incident controverſies for our better and more direct proceeding in the principall Treatiſe: not as *Prolegomena*, or Preface to the purpoſe, but as things eſſentiall and of the ſubſtance

of

of our matter. Wherein, if I have either omitted any thing pertinent, or admitted ought that is ſuperfluous, I hope, the *eye of Favour* will winke at my miſſing; as for the *malicious*, ſeeing I cannot looke for favourable acceptance, I weigh not their verdict: only as the Poet ſayth, *Equitem mihi plaudere curo.*

The baſer ſort I care to pleaſe no more,
One if I pleaſe, enough is me therefore.

FINIS.

H. Jamison

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